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THE PARITY PRINCIPLE
LuKE P. NoRRIs*
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA) in a
broad way that has allowed firms to widely privatize disputes with workers and
consumers. The resulting expansive growth of American arbitration law has left
commentators both concerned about the structural inequalities that permeate the
regime and in search of an effective limiting principle. This Article develops such a
limiting principle from the text and history of the FAA itself The Article reinter-
prets the text and history of section 1 of the statute, which, correctly read, excludes
individual employee-employer disputes from the statute's coverage. The Article
argues that section 1, though targeted at employees, is based on a parity principle
that holds that the state has reason to regulate and limit the enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements where deep economic power imbalances exist between the parties-
that is, where relative parity is lacking. The parity principle underlying section 1 can
best be understood through the lens of Progressive-Era thought at the time of the
FAA's enactment that focused on the regulatory responsibility of the state, through
public adjudication and legislation subject to judicial interpretation, to publicly
oversee the resolution of disputes and distribution of rights between parties of
highly disparate economic power. This Article develops the logic and theory of the
parity principle, and explores its implications for how courts should interpret the
FAA and for legislative and administrative reforms targeted at workers and
consumers.
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INTRODUCTION
The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA),' at its inception a
modest statute intended to allow merchants to arbitrate disputes, has
transformed American civil procedure. Building "an edifice of its own
creation," 2 the Supreme Court has interpreted the statute to apply to
millions of contracts of adhesion between firms and consumers and
workers across the economy.3 Along the way, the Court has displaced
much of state consumer and worker protection law under an expan-
sive preemption doctrine and read atop the statute a "national policy
favoring arbitration" 4 that has, among other things, resulted in con-
tractual ambiguities being read in favor of arbitration and broadly
permitted the waiver of class action rights.5 Scholars have critiqued
the Court's FAA jurisprudence for producing a system that is not con-
stitutionally adequate,6 delegating the power to alter substantive
rights to private parties,7 and privatizing dispute resolution in ways
1 United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9
U.S.C. §H 1-15 (2012)).
2 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
3 See infra Section I.A.
4 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
5 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (holding that the FAA
preempts a state law prohibiting contracts from banning class-wide arbitration); Moses H.
Cone Mem'1 Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) (reading ambiguities
in favor of arbitration).
6 E.g., Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the
Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2809 (2015) (arguing that
present systems of mandated arbitration, without sufficient safeguards or transparency,
should be considered unconstitutional).
7 E.g., David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 437 (2011)
(exploring mandated arbitration as an impermissible delegation of legislative power to the
private sphere); Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REv. 1793, 1809-14 (2014)
(critiquing the Court's preference for arbitration over adjudication); Jean R. Sternlight,
Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration:
A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72
TUL. L. REV. 1, 13 n.38 (1997) (surveying scholarship and case law on mandatory
arbitration as improper delegation).
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that undercut the development and vitality of law.8 Indeed, some
scholars predict that arbitration's effect on public adjudication,
through shifting disputes into privatized processes, may spell the "end
of law." 9
Two basic problems permeate these critiques: what I call the
power differential problem and the regulatory enforcement problem.
The power differential problem is that, because firms mandate arbitra-
tion with parties who lack meaningful bargaining strength, they are
able to erode the public protections and processes that benefit those
parties in favor of privatized processes that are designed by firms.
These processes redound to firms' benefit as repeat players, and
unlike public processes, are not largely utilized by the parties sub-
jected to the arbitration mandate.10 The regulatory enforcement
problem is that, in part because of the way those processes are struc-
tured and in part because they are often not utilized, parties such as
8 E.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS,
AND THE RULE OF LAw 33-51 (2013) (arguing that mass-market boilerplate forms that
curtail rights of public redress ultimately undermine private ordering); Myriam Gilles, The
Day Doctrine Died: Private Arbitration and the End of Law, 2016 U. ILL. L. REv. 371
(investigating how mandated arbitration may stall doctrinal development in entire areas of
law); J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE
L.J. 3052 (2015) (stating that recent developments in arbitration jurisprudence threaten
substantive law at large); Kathryn A. Sabbeth & David C. Vladeck, Contracting (Out)
Rights, 36 FORDHAM U". L.J. 803, 806-07 (2009) (lamenting the "sphere of privacy
surrounding arbitration"); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big
Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997
Wis. L. REv. 33, 110-21 (examining mandatory arbitration as a prospective waiver of
substantive rights); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the
Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 695-96 (1996)
(framing the lack of publicity and inadequate compensation as two socially costly features
of mandated arbitration).
9 E.g., Gilles, supra note 8; Glover, supra note 8; see also Richard M. Alderman,
Consumer Arbitration: The Destruction of the Common Law, 2 J. AM. ARB. 1, 11-17 (2003)
(warning that arbitration poses a particular risk to the development of consumer
protections); Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in
Contract Law, 71 FoRDHAM L. REV. 761, 785 (2002) (noting that decisions from arbitration
do not follow or contribute to precedent); Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The
End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1, 28-32 (2004) (addressing mandatory arbitration as one
means by which the law has receded from public scrutiny); cf David L. Noll, Regulating
Arbitration, 105 CALIF. L. REv. 985 (2017) (exploring how arbitration can subvert or
undermine the enforcement of statutory regulation); Resnik, supra note 6, at 2817
(considering how arbitration law affects and interacts with "the contingency of courts as
public institutions").
10 See infra notes 97, 227-29 and accompanying text; see also Eric W. Macaux, Limiting
Representation in the Age of Private Law: Exploring the Ethics of Limited-Forum Retainer
Agreements, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 795, 806-07 (2006) ("[T]he plaintiffs most likely to
be disadvantaged [by arbitration are] . . . low income individuals . . . ."); Nantiya Ruan,
What's Left to Remedy Wage Theft? How Arbitration Mandates that Bar Class Actions
Impact Low-Wage Workers., 2012 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1103 (exploring how arbitration and
class action bans remedy wage theft).
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workers and consumers are not enforcing the statutes that establish
their rights and regulate firms and the economy."
Because so much of the law of arbitration and its ability to dis-
place public adjudication hinges on how courts interpret the terse text
of the FAA, scholars have developed two theoretical paradigms of the
FAA to guide its interpretation and address these problems. These
paradigms are built from the FAA's text, history, and purposes to jus-
tify or critique the Court's FAA jurisprudence. The first is the "con-
tract" paradigm, which reads a focus on freedom of contract from the
language in section 2 of the statute about enforcing arbitration con-
tracts.12 The second is a "procedural reform" paradigm, which reads
from various parts of the statute a commitment to easily adjudicating
disputes on the merits in arbitral fora.13
Each paradigm illuminates the meaning of the FAA, and each has
its limitations. For example, the contract paradigm is used by scholars
to query the extent to which contracts of adhesion binding millions of
consumers and workers across the economy fit the FAA's model of
arms-length bargaining among merchants.1 4 Similarly, the procedural
reform paradigm would give judges the ability to set aside agreements
to arbitrate when they interfere with resolving disputes on the
merits.' 5 However, the paradigms may not be best suited to
addressing the power differential and regulatory enforcement
problems, and this Article therefore suggests another source for
addressing them. The paradigms assume the permissibility of priva-
tization as the default, and move away from that default when con-
tractual deficiencies or procedural hurdles threaten the integrity of
privatized process. But this is not always the approach of the FAA.
Section 1 of the statute excludes individual workers, switching the
default to federal courts not enforcing arbitration contracts. In this
way, section 1 provides a puzzle for these paradigms: Its exception is
not limited to circumstances where there are contract formation issues
or where disputes cannot plausibly be adjudicated on the merits in
arbitration. Section 1 offers a broader limit on arbitration and there-
fore suggests a different underlying principle.
I argue that section 1 is indeed undergirded by a different under-
lying principle, one that addresses the power differential and regula-
tory enforcement problems more directly. Section 1 can best be
understood as being motivated by what I refer to as a parity principle.
11 See infra note 97; supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
12 See infra Section I.A.
13 See infra Section I.B.
14 See infra Section I.C.
15 See infra Section I.C.
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It roughly holds that where wide economic power disparities exist
between parties, the state has reason to insist on public adjudication
rather than arbitration. The principle does not always hold wherever
there is a power disparity. For example, it may not apply where a
small business must arbitrate with a large business, as was the case in
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.16 It holds most
strongly where unorganized, individual parties must resolve disputes
with corporate parties. The principle, I will argue, is better suited to
addressing the power differential and regulatory enforcement
problems. By focusing on how the unbalanced nature of certain eco-
nomic relationships provide the state with reason to be skeptical of
privatized dispute resolution, the principle addresses head on the
power differential problem. And, as I explore in greater detail below,
section 1 also offers a regulatory theory of why the state should insist
as the default on public adjudication and judicial interpretation of cer-
tain statutes when those parties are involved. In doing so, the theory
responds to the regulatory enforcement problem.
The impulse driving this Article, then, is that section 1 has more
to offer for arbitration theory than scholars have thought. Thus, while
the contract paradigm, as the leading paradigm of the FAA, begins
with section 2's text about enforcing contracts specifying arbitration,
this Article begins with the text of section 1, where Congress circum-
scribes the universe of arbitration. As scholars have long recognized
and argued, section 1's command that "nothing herein contained shall
apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or
any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate com-
merce" 17 was intended to exclude all workers within Congress's
sphere of regulatory authority from the statute's coverage.' 8 A narrow
Supreme Court majority in Circuit City Stores v. Adams concluded
otherwise, finding that the clause was limited to classes of workers like
seamen and railroad employees,1 9 and scholars and the dissenters
have well mined the legislative history to show that this conclusion is
incorrect. 20
16 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309.(2013). It also may not extend to an individual consumer where
that consumer is a well-resourced and financially sophisticated party.
17 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
18 See infra Section III.A; see also Matthew W. Finkin, "Workers' Contracts" Under the
United States Arbitration Act: An Essay in Historical Clarification, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 282, 298 (1996); Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme
Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 99, 106-08 (2006).
19 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001).
2 See id. at 124-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 133-40 (Souter, J., dissenting);
Moses, supra note 18, at 106-08; see also Finkin, supra note 18; infra Section III.A.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
253May 2018]1
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
This Article adds to these critiques of the Circuit City decision
but also endeavors to build upon these arguments to show that, prop-
erly understood, section 1 offers more than a definitional exclusion of
employees that aids in judicial interpretation. Studying its legislative
history, one can glean a limiting principle from within the FAA that
reveals the logic of why and where the framers of the statute intended
to limit arbitration's reach.
I develop this argument about the parity principle in two ways.
First, I reconstruct the history of section 1. I consider together the
legislative history around excluding employees from the Act's cov-
erage with other statements in the legislative history that flesh out
section 1's meaning.21 These sources demonstrate how economic
power differentials motivated the inclusion of section 1 in the statute.
Brought into legislative discussions by labor leaders, section 1 was
fueled by a concern that if Congress did not act to exclude workers
from the FAA, workers would sign contracts specifying arbitration out
of necessity and be subjected to private processes that lacked the pro-
tections of the judicial system. Leading reformers and congressmen
expressed concern that enforcing arbitration clauses in this context
would lead weaker parties to be taken advantage of in privatized
processes. This concern, for them, triggered the need for Congress to
protect workers through insisting on public adjudication.
Conceptualized at a time when the federal government's ability
to protect workers was in dispute, section 1 stands out as both worker-
protectionist and litigation-promoting. Thus, rather than only treating
section 1 as a worker exclusion in the service of critiquing the Court's
decision in Circuit City, I ask what the fact that the framers of the
FAA took this ambitious step says about their views of the federal
government's role in policing the line between privatized process and
public adjudication. I argue that the history of section 1 both defines
and in historical light reflects the beginnings of the federal govern-
ment's commitment to publicly overseeing disputes between indi-
vidual workers and firms and thereby, through public process,
protecting workers.
Second, I argue that this history can best be interpreted as
offering a deeper principle that comes into shape through the lens of
21 Scholars have placed this history under the frame of the contract paradigm to clarify
the kinds of mutual assent that informed section 2 and to critique contracts of adhesion.
See, e.g., Moses, supra note 18, at 106-08 (exploring legislators' and drafters' statements
about economic power disparities to argue that section 2 extended only to merchant-to-
merchant contracts and was not intended to apply to contracts of adhesion).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
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Progressive-Era thought.22 As a descriptive matter, the framers of the
FAA embraced Progressive-Era thinking by viewing the relationship
between workers and employers through the lens of power differen-
tials, seeing how power disparities made the notion of freedom of con-
tract inapt in the employer-employee context in light of the weaker
bargaining power of workers, who would sign contracts specifying
arbitration out of necessity rather than choice. This view differs sub-
stantially from the freedom of contract view that characterized much
of constitutional jurisprudence at the time,23 as well as from the view
that animates the Supreme Court's current interpretation of the
FAA.24
As a normative matter and a statement of regulatory theory, the
framers of the FAA believed that in light of these significant power
imbalances and their social welfare effects for workers, the state
should intervene to rebalance the scales, protecting workers not only
from privatized processes of dispute resolution by insisting that fed-
eral courts not enforce arbitration agreements between them and their
employers, but also by passing regulatory legislation that would be
subjected to judicial interpretation. Thus, precisely because with the
rise of industrialism firms had accrued great power, the framers' con-
cern was that allowing the parties whom our legal system had already
benefitted to force weaker parties to "contract out" of public process
would remove the state from its role in policing economic arrange-
ments and making them compatible with public or constitutional
values.
The framers of the FAA thus envisioned a shared role for
Congress, through legislating, and for courts in providing economi-
cally less powerful parties with procedural rights, in regulating the
power disparities that industrialism had created. Section 1, then, is
rooted in both American law's reckoning with the rise of industrial
capitalism and a vision of the role of law and public adjudication in
22 While I outline this progressive view in Part II, the progressive tradition with regard
to arbitration is not monolithic and indeed is complicated. For example, the views that I
develop here about workers and economic power can be distinguished from more
paternalistic progressive impulses behind local forms of arbitration and conciliation used in
the early twentieth century to "promote the Americanization of the urban immigrant
poor." Amalia D. Kessler, Arbitration and Americanization: The Paternalism of
Progressive Procedural Reform, 124 YALE L.J. 2940, 2955 (2015). Similarly, after the
enactment of the FAA, Frances Kellor, a progressive reformer committed to
Americanization who was also a leader of the American Arbitration Association, became
an arbitration evangelist in ways that conflict with the economic views described here. See
id. at 2989-90 (describing how Kellor adopted a free market view of arbitration that found
unproblematic arbitration between firms and mass consumers).
2 See infra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
24 See infra Section I.C.
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regulating it-a vision prefiguring the one that came to characterize
the New Deal legal order a decade later. In this way, the logic under-
lying section 1 is embedded in a theory of public regulation that dem-
onstrates why today's regulatory enforcement gaps are concerning.
Several implications flow from recognizing the parity principle.
At the most general level, it conflicts with the Court's current under-
standing of the economic commitments of the FAA and its reformers.
The Court views the enforcement of contracts as the FAA's central
goal and, in what I refer to as a neo-contractarian approach, upholds
arbitration agreements even in relationships that lack the indicia of
consent and mutual bargaining that characterize contract law tradi-
tionally, viewing the statute as being largely indifferent to economic
power disparities.25 The parity principle instead shows how the judi-
cial enforcement of arbitration contracts that section 2 envisions is
subject to a limiting principle that is both internal to the FAA and
premised on relative parity. It is a limiting principle that is attuned to
how disparities in economic power can infect privatized process and
that articulates the baseline reasons for the legal system both to pro-
tect less advantaged parties through regulation and to use public pro-
cess to enforce that regulation. The parity principle is thus responsive
to the power differential and regulatory enforcement problems.
Furthermore, the principle both aids in judicial interpretion of
the FAA and provides a better theoretical framework from which to
argue for legislative amendments and administrative actions limiting
worker and consumer arbitration. With regard to judicial interpreta-
tion, as I argue in Part III, the parity principle demonstrates the incor-
rectness of the Supreme Court's extension of the statute to individual
workers and calls into question its decisions broadly allowing the arbi-
tration of statutory rights designed to protect less powerful parties.
Workers, of course, are the subjects of section 1's text, reflecting the
fact that worker issues dominated early twentieth century political,
legal, and constitutional debates. Section 1 therefore cannot be
applied to consumers as a matter of judicial interpretation. But the
theory of section 1 can inform legislative and administrative reforms
today. I thus explore how the logic of the parity principle extends
from workers to consumers and provides the most coherent and tai-
lored justifications for reform efforts to limit or ban worker and con-
sumer arbitration.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. In Part I, I outline the con-
tract and procedural reform paradigms and explore their implications
and limitations. In Part II, I develop the parity principle first by
25 See infra Section I.C.
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presenting the text and history of section 1 of the FAA. I then draw
out the principle's logic, consider its advantages, and respond to
potential objections to it: namely, that it relies too much on legislative
purpose, that changed circumstances undermine its usefulness, and
that it is in tension with the rise of labor union arbitration. In Part III,
I turn to implications, demonstrating how the principle can be used by
both purposivists and textualists to critique the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the scope of section 1 of the FAA, 26 and to the Court's
application of the FAA to statutory rights. I also argue that the prin-
ciple can better justify legislative and administrative reforms limiting
worker and consumer arbitration. This Article thus adds to the criti-
ques of how courts have interpreted the FAA, while laying out the
progressive foundations of the FAA that can guide reform efforts
beyond courts.
Before proceeding, a caveat is necessary. In developing the parity
principle, I recognize that there is no "founding moment of con-
sensus" in arbitration law and do not argue that the parity principle
reflects the only impulse guiding the FAA or American arbitration
law.2 7 I think that the contract and procedural reform paradigms are
legitimate and useful frameworks for interpreting the FAA. However,
I also think that the limiting impulses and logic underlying section 1
have been underexplored. Ultimately, then, my aim is to develop a
theory of section 1 much in the way that scholars have developed
these theories of other parts of the statute in order to provide a richer
account of the meaning, limitations, and significance of the FAA.
I
EXiISTING PARADIGMS OF TIIE FAA
In this Part, I explore and critique the two leading paradigms
through which the FAA is understood. The first is the contract para-
digm, which is pervasive within FAA cases and scholarship, and the
second is the procedural reform paradigm, which scholars have more
recently introduced into the literature. While each paradigm has much
to admire, each is also limited. I thus explore the implications and
limitations of the paradigms-limitations that suggest the need for a
26 I argue that this Article's account of the legislative history is methodologically useful
both to textualists and purposivists, since interpreters have found the text of section 1 to be
unclear-querying whether it is a broad employee exclusion or one limited to a small class
of workers. See infra Sections II.C.1, III.A. And generally, as I also explore below, the
Supreme Court has opened the door to purposive interpretation of the FAA, making this
Article's contributions timely. See infra Section II.C.1.
27 See Kessler, supra note 22, at 2991 (concluding that lawyers have disagreed with one
another on the efficacy of arbitration since the Progressive Era).
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stronger limiting principle for American arbitration law that the parity
principle ultimately provides.
A. Contract
The contract paradigm of the FAA is the most pervasive in the
cases and scholarship interpreting the statute?8 Under this model, the
FAA is principally about freedom of contract-namely, the freedom
to contract to arbitrate disputes. The model stems from section 2's
command that a "written provision in any . . . contract" mandating
arbitration "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract." 29 Courts have interpreted section 2 as being the central
pillar of the FAA.30 As one scholar describes this view, it holds that
"the overarching purpose of the FAA was to promote private
ordering in dispute resolution as free as possible from state interfer-
ence. "31 Or, as the Supreme Court put it, "the central or 'primary'
purpose of the FAA is to ensure that 'private agreements to arbitrate
are enforced according to their terms.'"32
The contract paradigm evolved out of historical circumstances
surrounding the ability of merchants to arbitrate with one another in
the United States. At the center of this history is the judicially created
revocability doctrine which, prior to the FAA's enactment, allowed
"revocation [of the arbitration provision] by either of the parties at
any time before the [arbitral] award."33 When parties revoked, courts
could not compel arbitration. As the Senate Report of the FAA
asserted, this made arbitration agreements "ineffectual" because the
aggrieved party lacked an adequate remedy to enforce the agree-
ment.34 Scholars have tied the revocability doctrine to a then-existing
judicial hostility to arbitration in the United States, growing out of
28 See, e.g., Hiro N. Aragaki, The Federal Arbitration Act as Procedural Reform, 89
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1939, 1941 (2014) (noting that the contract paradigm is "[f]ar and away the
dominant paradigm").
29 United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, Sec. 2, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as
amended at 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)).
30 See Stephen J. Ware, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Contracting out of
Government's Role in Punishment and Federal Preemption of State Law, 63 FORDHAM L.
REv. 529, 547 (1994); see also infra note 42 (collecting cases).
31 Aragaki, supra note 28, at 1941.
32 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682 (2010) (quoting Volt
Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Lehland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)).
33 S. REP. No. 68-536, at 2 (1924); see also IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION
LAw 20 (1992) (overviewing the history of the revocability doctrine).
3 S. REP. No. 68-536, at 2 (1924).
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courts' fear that arbitration might "oust" them of their jurisdiction.35
Proponents of the FAA came to believe that the revocability doctrine
was thus "rooted . . . in the jealousy of courts for their jurisdiction." 3 6
The FAA's solution, the FAA's architect argued in advocating for the
bill, was to no longer allow "the dishonest party [to] escape from his
obligations" and instead to treat arbitration agreements the same as
other enforceable contracts between merchants.37
The normative values of the FAA under the contract paradigm
therefore include "party autonomy, freedom of choice, and self-
governance free of interference by the state."38 Scholars disagree,
however, about whether these commitments are premised on arbitra-
tion between commercial parties. On one side, scholars such as Mar-
garet Moses assert that "the central concept behind the Act [was] to
provide for enforceability of arbitration agreements between
merchants-parties presumed to be of approximately equal bar-
gaining strength." 39 These scholars not only limit the reach of the
FAA but also tend to fold questions about parity into the contract
model, arguing that a lack of parity can indicate a lack of the kind of
consent that contract law typically requires. 40 On the other side,
scholars such as Stephen Ware contend that the FAA "explicitly
enacted [a] contractual approach to arbitration law" 41 that sweeps
35 See Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12
VA. L. REv. 265, 283 (1926) (discussing the common law origins of judicial hostility to
arbitration).
36 Id.
37 Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R. 646
Before the J. Comm. of Subcomms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 16, 38-39 (1924)
[hereinafter Joint Hearings] (statement of Julius Henry Cohen).
38 Aragaki, supra note 28, at 1946.
39 Moses, supra note 18, at 106 ("The hearings make clear that the focus of the Act was
merchant-to-merchant arbitrations, never merchant-to-consumer arbitrations."); see also
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 409 (1967) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the FAA's "legislative history ... indicates that the Act was to
have a limited application to contracts between merchants for the interstate shipment of
goods").
40 See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 8, at 676-77 (arguing that there is a lack of consent in
employment and consumer contracts due to unequal bargaining power).
41 Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (With a
Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 McGEORGE L. REv. 195, 197 (1998).
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broadly across contracting parties in interstate commerce,42 save a few
parties explicitly excluded in section 1.43
A divided Supreme Court has embraced the latter approach,44
and endorsed a thinner conception of contractual consent.45 Indeed,
the contract paradigm has had a strong pull on the law of arbitration,
and the Court has interpreted the FAA's commitment to contract as
its central pillar. Reasoning from the supposed "national policy
favoring arbitration" embodied by the FAA,46 courts have: found that
the FAA preempts state laws that impede its contract-enforcement
purposes,47 enforced arbitration agreements found on shrink-wrap
accompanying shipped products,48 resolved contractual ambiguities
about whether arbitration was intended in favor of arbitration, 49 and
allowed arbitrators to adjudicate disputes about whether the parties
agreed to arbitrate.50 Indeed, the Supreme Court recently upheld an
arbitration clause that appeared to make arbitration itself impracti-
cable by employing contract-enforcement reasoning. In American
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, in which a contract-
42 See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, The Effects of Gilmer: Empirical and Other Approaches to
the Study of Employment Arbitration, 16 Omo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 735, 738 (2001)
("The FAA's contractual approach applies to employees' agreements to arbitrate, just as it
applies to any other party's agreement to arbitrate.").
43 United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, § 1, 43 Stat. 883, 883 (1925) (stating that
"nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce").
44 See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) ("The
preeminent concern of Congress in passing the [FAA] was to enforce private agreements
into which parties had entered, and that concern requires that we rigorously enforce
agreements to arbitrate . . . ."); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984)
(concluding that section 2 generally "mandate[s] the enforcement of arbitration
agreements").
45 See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under
the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REv. 931, 962 & n.171 (1999) (gathering Supreme
Court and federal court cases "compelling arbitration when consent is thin, if not outright
fictitious," including cases involving "arbitration agreements that appear in a document
incorporated into a contract by reference, even when one party had no opportunity to see
or no reason to anticipate the incorporated term").
46 Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008); see also Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682 (2010) ("[T]he central or primary purpose of
the FAA is to ensure that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their
terms.").
47 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (holding that the
FAA preempted a California rule that found contracts unconscionable because they
disallow class-wide claims); Southland, 465 U.S. at 16 (holding that the FAA required
franchisees suing under California state law to arbitrate their claims against a franchisor as
required by their contracts).
48 Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150-51 (7th Cir. 1997) (enforcing an
arbitration agreement found inside a box containing computer software).
49 Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
50 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967).
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mandated ban on class arbitration likely meant that plaintiffs would
not bring an antitrust claim because the cost of individual arbitration
would exceed the potential award, the Court still upheld the
mandatory arbitration clause because "the FAA's command to
enforce arbitration agreements trumps any interest in ensuring the
prosecution of low-value claims."51
Over the past several decades, the contract paradigm has seem-
ingly swallowed other considerations in the FAA context. Historically,
the Supreme Court exhibited skepticism toward allowing arbitration
of statutory rights, finding that statutory claims under the Securities
Act of 1933 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act could not be arbi-
trated because adjudication better protected the statutory rights in
question.52 However, the Court began to move away from this posi-
tion in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
where the Court found that "[t]he preeminent concern of Congress in
passing the Act was to enforce private agreements into which parties
had entered."53 Since then, the Court has expanded the scope of statu-
tory claims that can be resolved in arbitration, allowing arbitration "so
long as the prospective litigant may effectively vindicate [his or her]
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum."5 4
B. Procedural Reform
More recently, principally due to contributions by Hiro Aragaki
and Imre Szalai, scholars have viewed the FAA through a procedural
reform paradigm. Under this model, the FAA was part of the process
by which reformers sought to simplify procedure in order to let parties
51 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 n.5 (2013).
52 See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435-36 (1953) (declining to enforce an
arbitration provision for a Securities Act claim because the statute "was drafted with an
eye to the disadvantages under which buyers [of securities] labor" and awards could be
issued without explanation or the right to appeal the arbitrator's "conception of the legal
meaning of . .. statutory requirements."); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,
56 (1974) (declining to enforce an arbitration provision with regard to a Title VII claim
because arbitration was a "comparatively inappropriate forum for the final resolution of
rights created by Title VII").
53 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213,
221 (1985) (alteration in original)).
54 Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (quoting Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (alteration in original)). More
recently, the Court has suggested an even stricter approach. Thus, where in Green Tree,
531 U.S. at 90, the Court concluded that high costs might preclude a party from effectively
vindicating rights, in American Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2310-12 (2013), the Court concluded
that an arbitration clause only is suspect when it forces a party to waive its "right" to
vindicate a statutory claim. See also Aragaki, supra note 28, at 2018-21 (examining shifts in
the Court's reasoning with respect to arbitration of statutory claims).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
May 2018] 261
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
more swiftly and effectively adjudicate disputes on the merits.5 5 This
perspective links the passage of the FAA in 1925 and the rise of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 193856 as alternative mechanisms
responding to the same problem: procedure had become too compli-
cated and adjudication on the merits was too often thwarted by it?5
The FAA thus "originally arose out of debates about the need for
reform in judicial procedure that captivated the nation in the early
twentieth century."5 8 At the time, there were no federal rules of civil
procedure in actions at law and federal district courts generally fol-
lowed state civil procedure.59 Reformers complained of increasingly
complex systems of state procedure, focusing on voluminous codes
that had turned procedure into a "sport"60 allowing crafty lawyers to
55 Aragaki thus links the FAA to the procedural simplification and reform efforts of
leading lawyers such as Charles Clark and Roscoe Pound. Aragaki, supra note 28, at
1978-80.
56 FED. R. Civ. P. (1938). The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064
(codified as amended 28 U.S.C. § 2072) delegated authority to the Supreme Court to
implement uniform rules for the federal courts, which led to the promulgation of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.
57 See Aragaki, supra note 28, at 1973-88 (describing the historical relationship
between procedural reform and the FAA).
58 Id. at 1942; see also IMRE S. SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN
ARBITRATION LAWS IN AMERICA 166-73 (2013) (describing the push for modern
arbitration laws as a conscious element of a broader movement for procedural reform);
Imre S. Szalai, Obituary for the Federal Arbitration Act: An Older Cousin to Modern Civil
Procedure, 2010 J. Dise. RESOL. 391, 411-19 (arguing that arbitration reform was an
"outgrowth" of procedural reform responding to "dissatisfaction with the confusing,
technical procedural landscape during the early 1900s").
59 Since the beginning of the republic, federal courts lacked the authority to draft rules
of procedure for actions at law. Instead, in actions at law, federal courts employed state law
procedure as mandated by the Process Act of 1789. Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat.
93, 93-94; see also 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1002 (3rd ed. 2002) (discussing the development of procedural rules in
federal courts up to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). For about the
first century of the country's existence, federal courts applied the state law procedures that
were in effect at the time that the state had joined the union, even if the procedural
practices within the state had evolved through common law or the adoption of codes of
procedure. See, e.g., Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Process Act of 1789 and establishing the right of federal courts to
set their own procedures); P. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WESCHLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 668-70 (2d ed. 1973) (discussing the implementation
of state procedural rules in federal courts under the Process Act of 1789). The Conformity
Act of 1872 ended this regime, mandating that federal courts follow the procedures
currently used in the states where they sat. Conformity Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5-6,
17 Stat. 196, 197; see also JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., 1 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 512-14, 574-75 (1971)
(describing the passage of the Process Act of 1789 and its impact on federal procedure).
6 Roscoe Pound, Some Principles of Procedural Reform, 4 U. ILL. L. REV. 388, 391
(1910) (stating that under the "sporting theory of justice ... judicial administration of
justice is a game, to be played to the bitter end as a game of football might be .... ); see
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confuse, delay, and otherwise complicate the process of achieving
adjudication on the merits.61 Frustrated by the way that procedure
had interfered with adjudicating disputes on the merits, reformers
sought to simplify procedure and saw arbitration as one solution. 62
Thus, while one route to procedural reform was to merge law and
equity under flexible rules of federal civil procedure, as the Rules
Enabling Act of 1934 and Federal Rules in 193863 eventually did,
another way for reformers to address the problem was to "promot[e]
access to an alternative forum whose simplicity, flexibility, and intoler-
ance of technicalities embodied the basic procedural reform values." 64
The enactment of the FAA was therefore an early procedural reform
intended to make it easier for parties to litigate disputes effectively.
The driving force behind the FAA was "that procedure was not an
end in itself but rather a means to the more important objective of
securing substantial justice." 65 Section 2's command that contracts
mandating arbitration be enforced was intended "to simplify business
disputing procedure and to improve the administration of justice." 66
The FAA on this understanding was not designed to allow parties
to evade the dictates of law or regulation, but as a simplifying reform
intended to make procedure a "handmaid" of justice.67 As Hiro
Aragaki puts it, "[p]rocedural and arbitration law reform can thereby
also Aragaki, supra note 28, at 1966 n.132 (collecting references to procedural reformers
that compare complex procedure to games or sport).
61 New York's Field Code, adopted in 1848 and followed by similar codes in other
states, is a leading example of a long and complicated code. See An Act to Simplify and
Abridge the Practice, Pleadings and Proceedings of the Courts of this State, Act of Apr. 12,
1848, ch. 379, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497. It was criticized by law reformers as being
"unnecessarily rigid and elaborate." EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE
PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 28 (2000).
62 See, e.g., MAcNEIL, supra note 33, at 29 (arguing that reformers "saw the reform of
arbitration as part of a broader package of legal simplification").
63 FED. R. Civ. P. (1938).
6 See Aragaki, supra note 28, at 1943.
65 Id. at 1973.
66 Id. at 1976-77 (internal quotations and alterations omitted).
67 Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 297 (1938); see
also id., at 303 (stating that the American Arbitration Association was exercising
"[v]igilant care that [arbitration] procedure remain simple and effective"). Aragaki notes
that although procedural reformers like Clark had "other reservations about informal
tribunals," they "sometimes pointed to arbitration as an example of how a forum that had
fewer technical rules and that vested greater discretion in the decisionmaker to disregard
them could nonetheless administer justice effectively." Aragaki, supra note 28, at 1979
n.193; see also Charles E. Clark, Procedural Fundamentals, 1 CONN. B.J. 67, 71 (1927)
(noting that arbitration successfully administers justice without strict pleading rules).
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be understood as alternative responses, inspired by similar values, to
the same basic problem."68
C. Implications and Limitations
Both the contract and procedural reform paradigms illuminate
the meaning and purposes of the FAA. But neither provides a com-
prehensive theory of the statute. As a baseline matter, each para-
digm's internal logic for limiting arbitration cannot fully explain the
presence of section 1 in the statute and its wholesale exception for
individual workers. Put another way, the paradigms cannot explain
why, even if arbitration process can produce a merits decision and
there are no contract formation issues, the state would limit federal
courts in enforcing some arbitration agreements, as Congress did with
those involving workers and employers in section 1. At a deeper level,
this fact relates to why section 1 supplies a logic that more fully
addresses the power differential and regulatory enforcement
problems.
Section 1 excludes an entire class of contracting persons-indi-
vidual workers in interstate commerce contracting with employers-
from the statute's coverage.69 Under the logic of the contract para-
digm, this exception is a puzzle. The contract paradigm would only
exclude contracting people from the statute's coverage where contrac-
tual deficiencies such as unconscionability, fraud, or duress under-
mined contractual consent.70 Clearly, not every employment contract
between an individual worker and an employer would qualify as one
involving such a deficiency. Therefore, section 1 seems to suggest a
different limiting principle, one that the paradigm does not capture.
The contract paradigm does have tools for allowing courts to
refuse to enforce arbitration agreements, and those tools focus in part
on power differentials between the parties. The contract paradigm
therefore might be thought to be getting at the power differential
problem. However, the contract paradigm's chief tool for addressing
this problem, unconscionability, has been largely unsuccessful as
applied by courts. Under the doctrine, courts can generally refuse to
enforce contracts specifying arbitration that are so one-sided, unfair,
oppressive, or abusive that enforcing them would be unconscionable.
Courts, however, have made the hill to climb to prove unconsciona-
bility in arbitration incredibly high because, as I suggested above,
their baseline conception of contractual consent is so thin in the first
68 Aragaki, supra note 28, at 1986.
69 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
70 Aragaki, supra note 28, at 2019.
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place. In many instances, courts have held that providing parties with
a short period to reject an arbitration agreement precludes a finding
of unconscionability 7l (even though "[t]he opt-out period is part of
the boilerplate [and] is no more likely to be read, understood, or acted
upon than any other fine print term");72 construed narrowly the
unconscionability defense (as well as fraud and duress defenses) in
light of the supposed national policy favoring arbitration;73 and, as I
mentioned above, have found state unconscionability laws to be pre-
empted because they conflict with the FAA's commitment to
enforcing agreements specifying arbitration.74 Thus, as courts have
increasingly employed a thin view of the kind of consent that must
inhere in contract and of the kinds of defects that might trigger the
applicability of the defense, unconscionability has withered as a lim-
iting tool.7 5
However, even in its heyday, unconscionability was employed
conservatively in the arbitration context. Indeed, many courts
employed a more rigorous unconscionability standard in the arbitra-
tion context than in others.76 And other courts made an underlying
71 E.g., Davis v. O'Melveny & Myers, 485 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that
"if an employee has a meaningful opportunity to opt out of the arbitration provision when
signing the agreement and still preserve his or- her job, then [the agreement] is not
procedurally unconscionable" and collecting cases); Guadagno v. E*Trade Bank, 592 F.
Supp. 2d 1263, 1270 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (precluding a finding of unconscionability when the
plaintiff had 60 days to opt-out in writing); Sanders v. Comcast Cable Holdings, LLC, No.
3:07-cv-918-J-33HTS, 2008 WL 150479, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2008) (stating plaintiff
could have opted out); see also Honig v. Comcast of Ga. I, LLC, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1289
(N.D. Ga. 2008) ("[Plaintiffs] ability to opt out of the arbitration provision dilutes her
unconscionability argument because the provision was not offered on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis."). But see Clerk v. First Bank of Del., 735 F. Supp. 2d 170, 183 (E.D. Pa. 2010)
(noting that "the presence of an opt out clause does not automatically spare the arbitration
provision from a finding of procedural unconscionability" and collecting cases).
72 David Horton, Mass Arbitration and Democratic Legitimacy, 85 U. COLo. L. REv.
459, 483 (2014).
73 E.g., David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923 F.2d 245, 248-49 (2d
Cir. 1991) (holding that, as an experienced member of his field, plaintiff had notice of the
use of arbitration clauses).
74 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
75 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). Scholars dispute
whether, after Concepcion, categorical unconscionability rules applying equally in
arbitration and litigation survive preemption analysis. Compare Myriam Gilles & Gary
Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,
79 U. Cm. L. REv. 623, 651 (2012) (arguing that such rules could survive preemption
analysis), with Hiro N. Aragaki, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion and the Antidiscrimination
Theory of FAA Preemption, 4 PENN ST. Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 39, 67, 79-80 (2012)
(arguing that they could not).
76 See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The
Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19
Omo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 757, 803-07, 842 (2004) (exploring how the courts have
employed unconscionability cautiously and listing "specific traits" courts looked for in
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problem with the arbitration clause itself a prerequisite for finding the
contract to be unconscionable.77 Overall, the unconscionability doc-
trine's weakness as a tool for regulating arbitration agreements stems
from various causes, including its dependence on how contractual con-
sent is construed, the willingness of courts to use the doctrine-which
is not without its critics7 8-to interfere with contracts, and the ease
with which courts have found state unconscionability laws to be pre-
empted by the FAA.79 Thus, as contract has become the principal
vehicle for interpreting the FAA, unconscionability has failed to effec-
tively limit arbitration where power is disparate.
Failing to rein in arbitration through contractual defenses like
unconscionability, scholars have attempted to do so through the prism
of the concept of contract itself, taking aim at how underlying power
disparities between the parties make the model of contract inapt in
the context of arbitration. Though a rich debate has taken off about
how power dynamics between parties with deeply unequal power and
ability to bargain should affect the extension of the concept of con-
tract to arbitration law, these efforts have largely failed to limit the
rise of arbitration or address the power differential problem.
On the one side, scholars argue that it is either not unreasonable
or is objectively reasonable for consumers and employees to be bound
by arbitration agreements, even if they have no bargaining power and
have not read the arbitration clause. They rationalize this position
either because arbitration provides efficiency benefits as compared to
more expensive and time-consuming litigation,80 or because it lowers
prices for companies and the savings may be passed back to con-
sumers in the form of lower prices and workers in the form of higher
arbitration clauses before finding them unconscionable); cf Michael G. McGuinness &
Adam J. Karr, California's "Unique" Approach to Arbitration: Why This Road Less
Traveled Will Make All the Difference on the Issue of Preemption Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 2005 J. Disp. RESOL. 61, 85-90 (2005) (noting how California departs from
this dominant approach and applies heightened unconscionability standards in arbitration
cases).
77 See Stempel, supra note 76, at 842 (noting that courts "have looked for a particular
type of problem in the arbitration arrangement as a prerequisite for refusing to enforce the
text of the written clause").
78 See id. at 813-29 (overviewing various critiques of the unconscionability doctrine).
79 See, e.g., Aragaki, supra note 28, at 1956-58.
80 See, e.g., Charles B. Craver, The Use of Non-Judicial Procedures to Resolve
Employment Discrimination Claims, 11 KAN. J.L. & Pus. POL'Y 141, 158 (2001) ("Fair
arbitral procedures can provide a more expeditious and less expensive alternative that may
benefit workers more than judicial proceedings."); Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for
Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements,
16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 559, 563 (2001) ("In a world without employment
arbitration as an available option, we would essentially have a 'cadillac' system for the few
and a 'rickshaw' system for the many.").
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wages.81 Furthermore, scholars argue that the lack of mutual bar-
gaining is not fatal in adhesion contracts containing arbitration
clauses, since they are common in the modern economy and are
entered into voluntarily and should be no less enforceable in arbitra-
tion than they are elsewhere. 82 In recent years, this position has been
embraced broadly by the Court, which has enforced arbitration
clauses in contracts of adhesion and contracts where one party is una-
ware of the arbitration clause.83
On the other side, commentators assert that courts-ignoring the
norms of shared power that undergird contract-have stretched con-
tractual consent beyond its limits in arbitration law. Under this under-
standing, arbitration law has diverged from the classically liberal
notion of freedom of contract based on mutual assent and bargaining.
Instead, these scholars argue that the Court's FAA jurisprudence has
attributed contractual consent broadly across contracts of adhesion
and in other circumstances that deviate from widely understood
notions of contracting." As Judith Resnik has explained, the Court
enforces agreements to arbitrate that diverge from "fundamental prin-
ciples of contract law." 85 For example, it widely honors contracts of
adhesion that are "products of non-bargaining." In a seminal article,
Arthur Leff called such agreements "thing[s]," or "unilaterally manu-
factured commodities," rather than contracts. 86 This is why I refer to
81 E.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv.
695, 741 (noting that even "one-sided arbitration clauses" may be beneficial to individuals
"if the resulting cost savings are passed on to consumers through reductions in the price of
goods and services, to employees through higher wages"); Stephen J. Ware, Paying the
Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. Disp.
RESOL. 89 (exploring the "pro-consumer" aspect of arbitration argeements, and asking
when, if ever, the costs of judicial intervention may outweigh the benefits).
82 Ware, supra note 41, at 201 ("There is no duress in the typical 'adhesion' contract. A
consumer who contracts in such circumstances does so voluntarily."); id. at 210 ("The great
virtue of the contractual approach to contract law is the great virtue of contract
generally.").
83 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 346-47 (2011) (enforcing
an arbitration clause in a consumer contract with AT&T and noting that "the times in
which consumer contracts were anything other than adhesive are long past"); Horton,
supra note 72, at 463 ("More than ever, the Court seems steeled against the argument that
form contracts are non-consensual.").
84 See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rhetoric Versus Reality in Arbitration
Jurisprudence: How the Supreme Court Flaunts and Flunks Contracts, 75 L. & CoWrEMP.
PROBS. 129, 131 (2012) (arguing that the Court's "jurisprudence imposes on private parties,
impinges on freedom both of contract and from contract, intrudes upon state contract law,
and changes and distorts actual contract-law doctrine"); Resnik, supra note 6, at 2870-71
(exploring how the Court has stretched the notion of contract applicable to arbitration
clauses); cf Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 Am. U. L. REV. 131, 138 (1970)
(arguing, among other things, that contracts require "not only a deal, but dealing").
85 Resnik, supra note 6, at 2869-70.
86 Id. at 147.
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the Court's jurisprudence in this arena as neo-contractarian: it differs
even from traditional freedom of contract analyses in that the Court
does not presume bargaining or consideration between the parties.
Thus, scholars argue that while the contract paradigm "has some
appeal as applied to two entities engaging in an arm's length transac-
tion, it cannot realistically be used to justify imposing binding arbitra-
tion through contracts of adhesion on unwitting consumers." 87 Unlike
the merchants that the contract paradigm of the FAA is intended to
reach, consumers do not read, understand, or have any meaningful
ability to negotiate most of the contracts that commit them to binding
arbitration.88
Scholars also counter that contracts of adhesion in arbitration law
differ from contracts of adhesion across the economy. This is in part
because while contracts of adhesion can be theoretically "anchored in
voluntary, knowing agreement ... [to] the contractual husk," 89 arbi-
tration law treats them differently. With a blanket assent to the husk,
a party gives specific consent to the transaction and blanket consent to
"any not unreasonable" term90 and is thus aware that boilerplate
exists.91 This scenario cannot be extended to much of modern arbitra-
tion law. For example, many judges have embraced the concept of a
"rolling contract" and enforce arbitration clauses that come in later
mailings, emails, or even on shipping packages. 92 In these circum-
stances, it makes no sense to assume that a party is giving blanket
consent to the fine print, as the arbitration provision often comes after
the deal is made or is packaged in a clandestine manner.93
Finally, scholars take aim at the notion that less economically
powerful parties benefit from arbitration. Scholars argue, among
other things, that arbitration processes are structured to "slant the
odds in companies' favor" against workers and consumers; 94 that
repeat-player bias slants the system in favor of corporate actors; 95 and
that harmed parties pursue fewer claims in arbitral fora than in public
87 Sternlight, supra note 8, at 676.
88 Id. at 676-77.
89 Horton, supra note 72, at 480-81.
9 KARL L. LLEWELLYN, TIE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALs 370(1960).
91 Horton, supra note 72, at 482.
92 Id.; see also Hancock v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 701 F.3d 1248, 1259 (10th Cir. 2012)(email); Bank One v. Coates, 125 F. Supp. 2d 819, 826 (S.D. Miss. 2001) (bill stuffer); Hill
v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997) (shipping box).
93 Horton, supra note 72, at 482-83 (arguing that contract law must include a concept
of "nonconsent" in such scenarios).
94 Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REv.
1631, 1649 & n.97 (2005) (collecting sources).
9 Id. at 1650-51.
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adjudicatory fora.96 Scholars also query the "oversimplified" assump-
tion that firms will pass on litigation cost-savings back to consumers
and workers.97
To my mind, these critics of expanded arbitration have the better
argument than the proponents, but it is one that has had little effect
on the law. Using the concept of contractual consent to get at under-
lying power disparities has proven so difficult in part because the con-
cept of consent is contested.98 Despite the burgeoning academic
literature about how the contract paradigm should require stronger
notions of consent to fit the inter-merchant model of the FAA or the
legal concept of contract, courts have broadly adopted attenuated
notions of consent under the banner of the contract paradigm and
used it to expand the law of arbitration dramatically. 99 In a world
where firms offer take-it-or-leave-it adhesion forms to mass con-
sumers and employment agreements to workers mandating arbitra-
tion, the model of contract may be ill-suited to addressing the
underlying social welfare issues at stake. What may be needed is a
model that begins not with private ordering as the default, as contract
does, but instead with a positive theory of why the nature of certain
relationships makes stronger forms of public oversight necessary for
dispute resolution and the fulfillment of regulatory goals. As I argue
below, this is what the parity principle provides.
Perhaps as a result of the twin failures of unconscionability and
contractual consent to address these issues, scholars and courts have
96 See, e.g., Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration:
Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (2011) (analyzing data of
employment claims filed before the AAA and finding that about 1000 claims per year were
filed); Resnik, supra note 6, at 2893 ("Because so few individuals, as contrasted with those
eligible to bring claims, do so in the newly mandated system, arbitration works to erase
rather than to enhance the capacity to pursue rights."); id. at 2894 (finding that between
2009 and 2014, "134 individual consumers-or about 27 per year-[ ] filed claims through the
AAA against AT&T"). Empirical data from the Consumer Financial Protection Board also
support this assertion. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY
PRELIMINARY RESULTS 13 (Dec. 12, 2013) ("From 2010 through 2012, there was an annual
average of 415 individual AAA cases filed for four product markets combined: credit card,
checking account, payday loans, and prepaid cards.").
97 See Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate
Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 75, 93 (2004) ("While it is certainly true as a matter of economic theory
that all of a company's savings may be passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices,
it is also true that they may not.").
98 See Horton, supra note 72, at 480 ("Proving that adhesion contracts are non-
consensual is no easy task. For one, consent is an essentially contested concept, a term of
art that lacks a generally accepted meaning.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
99 See Stone, supra note 45, at 962 (stating that "in many recent cases, courts have
applied attenuated notions of consent, compelling arbitration when consent is thin, if not
outright fictitious").
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come to rely on principles external to the FAA, advocating, for
example, for strengthening the vindication-of-rights doctrine to rein in
arbitration of federal statutory claims. 00 This approach, in turn, might
be thought to get at the problem of regulatory enforcement by
denying enforcement of arbitration agreements where they interfere
with the vindication of statutory rights. But as I explored above in
Section A, this external doctrine has been weakened by interpreta-
tions of the contract paradigm internal to the FAA, which place con-
tract enforcement above all other values.101 All of this further suggests
that what may be needed is a limiting principle within the FAA
independent of the contract paradigm that can rein arbitration in and
more directly address the power differential and regulatory enforce-
ment problems.
Proponents of the procedural reform paradigm argue that it does
not suffer from many of these infirmities. Rather than focusing on
contested issues surrounding contract formation or the meaning of
consent, the procedural reform paradigm gives courts flexibility to
ensure that arbitration does not stand in the way of adjudicating dis-
putes on the merits. To the extent that arbitration today stands in the
way of allowing parties to do so, it deviates from the FAA's pur-
poses.1 02 Locating procedural reform values in the FAA could thus
allow courts to use equitable safety valves that give adjudicators dis-
cretion "to set aside even well-intentioned contractual directives when'
they end up interfering with" reaching a merits decision. 03 Procedural
reform values would, for example, enable a court to set aside even a
mutually-consented-to agreement where enforcement would create a
miscarriage of justice or where arbitral process would interfere with
the enforcement of a statutory right.1 04
Still, as a baseline matter, section 1 also remains a puzzle for the
paradigm: section 1 offers a wholesale prohibition against federal
judges enforcing individual worker arbitration agreements, even
where a resolution on the merits could be reached swiftly. Further-
more, the procedural reform paradigm's principal focus on whether a
merits decision can be reached in private fora may not make it an
100 See, e.g., Aragaki, supra note 28, at 2021-22.
101 See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text; see also Aragaki, supra note 28, at
1953-62.
102 Aragaki, supra note 28, at 2008 (explaining that similarly to early twentieth century
courts that were unable "to disregard procedural rules in the interest of ensuring
substantial justice, so courts today claim that the contract model requires them to enforce
contract procedures . . . even when doing so might prevent claims not just from being
adjudicated on their merits, but also from being brought at all").
103 Id. at 2021-22.
104 Id. at 2021-24.
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ideal vehicle for addressing power disparities. If the 1938 procedural
reforms succeeded in making public adjudication function better, it is
unclear why arbitration remained as necessary as a federal procedural
reform measure after that point, as firms used the statute to mandate
arbitration for parties like workers and consumers with little bar-
gaining power. Arguably, the obstacles of complex state procedural
codes had been removed with the advent of simplified federal rules of
civil procedure designed to aid parties in resolving disputes on the
merits, all with the benefits of due process and publicity protections
that might inure to the benefit of less powerful parties.
At the very least, even if arbitration remained preferable for rea-
sons of economy or preference for parties of relatively equal bar-
gaining power, the 1938 procedural reforms to public adjudication call
into question why the revocability doctrine was not resuscitated
decades later. During the second half of the 20th century, companies
demanded arbitration in contexts that increasingly looked different
from inter-merchant arbitration, provided thin or non-existent indicia
of consent, and instead suggested one-party control of arbitral
processes.10 5 With complex procedural labyrinths out of the way in
public adjudication, a revocation right would not so much allow for
gamesmanship as give less powerful parties the ability to access the
protections of public process. 106
Apart from the power differential problem, the procedural
reform paradigm would respond most directly to the regulatory
enforcement problem by breathing life back into the vindication-of-
rights doctrine.107 But the proponents of the paradigm admit that reg-
ulatory enforcement was not a central goal of the reformers who
championed the FAA as a tool of procedural reform, noting that it is
"less clear" that procedural reformers behind the FAA intended arbi-
tration to "facilitate the resolution of disputes through application of
the positive law to the facts."108
Moreover, when the paradigm becomes about enforcing law, it
equates resolving disputes on the merits, whether through arbitration
or courts, with doing "justice."1 09 This approach underemphasizes
105 See, e.g., Stone, supra note 45, at 1028 (proposing that the revocability doctrine be
revived so that parties of weaker bargaining power outside of the typical commercial
associations engaged in arbitration can opt out).
106 See Aragaki, supra note 28, at 1997 (noting that other commentators might question
the compatibility of abrogating revocability with a procedural reform agenda because the
doctrine "served the valid and important purpose of protecting weaker parties from
oppressive contract terms.").
107 Id. at 2021-22.
108 Id. at 2000.
109 Id.
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how having public proceedings-where a judge must give reasons to
the public and make decisions creating precedent, put the public on
notice of what the law means, and clarify public values and the scope
of rights-may be related to, or an essential part of, not only doing
justice in a constitutional democracy but also to ensuring that justice is
done for less powerful parties seeking to vindicate their rights. 10
Public processes may be integral both to the effective functioning of
dispute resolution when power disparities are so wide and to the effec-
tive functioning of public regulatory enforcement when private rights
of action are nested in federal and state regulations. Rather than
making public process the default in certain circumstances in order to
ensure that power does not infect process or that the regulatory state
works properly, however, the procedural reform paradigm relies on
giving judges ex post discretion "in extreme cases" to set aside con-
tractual directives mandating arbitration that would interfere with
reaching a merits decision.111
Once again, then, the same issue arises: what may be needed to
address the power disparity and regulatory enforcement problems is a
model that begins not with private ordering as the default but instead
with a positive theory of why the nature of certain relationships and
the content state's regulatory aims may make another default rule-
public process-better suited to resolving disputes between such par-
ties. My task in the following Part is to develop the history and theory
of section 1 to show that it leads to such a theory.
II
THE PARITY PRINCIPLE
In this Part, I develop the parity principle. In Section II.A, I
explore the legislative history of section 1's exclusion of employees
from the FAA and pair it with other legislative history to show how
the Act offers a broader view of the state's role in protecting certain
parties from arbitration outright in light of economic power dispari-
110 See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?,
99 HARV. L. REv. 668, 671 (1986) ("[W]e must determine whether ADR will result in an
abandonment of our constitutional system in which the 'rule of law' is created and
principally enforced by legitimate branches of government and whether rights and duties
will be delimited by those the law seeks to regulate."); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement,
93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085-87 (1984) (offering a conception of public adjudication as a
process by which a judge, who must hear a case and give reasons, articulates public values);
Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and
Adjudication, 10 OMo ST. J. ON Disp. REsOL. 211, 224 (1995) (noting that under the Wilko
standard, "[t]he arbitrator as dispute resolver was posited as a potential hazard to the state,
as lawmaker").
111 See Aragaki, supra note 28, at 2009, 2021-22.
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ties. In Section II.B, I explore how section 1 is best understood as
being animated by a parity principle that can be understood through
Progressive-Era legal thought: both articulating a power-based view of
what economic relationships between firms and workers look like and
a view of the role that the state should play in regulating those rela-
tionships by insisting on public adjudication rather than arbitration as
a default. In this way, I endeavor to show how the principle frames
both the power differential problem and justifies a regulatory enforce-
ment response.
This effort is therefore largely interpretive: to take the text of
section 1, the legislative history which directly speaks to excluding
employees, and other aspects of the legislative history that speak to
economic power together to reveal a deeper principle and situate it in
its context. Finally, in Section II.C, I weigh both the advantages of and
potential objections to the principle: including that it relies too much
on purpose as derived through legislative history, that changed cir-
cumstances have diluted its relevance or applicability, and'that it con-
flicts with the logic of another worker-protective form of dispute
resolution, labor arbitration.
A. Text and Legislative History
In section 1 of the FAA, before the statute details the circum-
stances where arbitration agreements will be enforced by federal
courts, Congress put up a wall, cabining arbitration. The few words-
"but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment
of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged
in foreign or interstate commerce"" 2-are no more expansive than
those in section 2 that form the basis of the contract paradigm. Like
the words in section 2, relatively concise legislative history from the
1923 and 1924 legislative hearings surrounds them."13 What distin-
guishes section 2 is that its text, legislative history, and historical con-
text have been unfolded and elaborated by courts and scholars into
the contract paradigm.1 14 This section traces the history of the
employment exclusion in section 1, and begins to suggest a broader
112 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
113 See, e.g., Aragaki, supra note 28, at 1950 (noting the small amount of text and
legislative history supporting the contract paradigm). The statute itself bears little
legislative history. See id. (noting that the record of discussions consists mainly "of (i)
testimony from less than three hours of hearings before House and Senate Judiciary
Committees and (ii) a mere six pages of House and Senate Reports").
114 See id. at 1949 (arguing that courts and commentators have unwound pieces of text
and legislative history into the contract paradigm as the statute's "raison d'8tre").
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interpretation of it, before turning to a more theoretical explanation
in the following section.
While section 2 focuses on the parties meant to be included in the
statute's coverage, section 1 begins with the parties meant to be
excluded from it. The focus on those parties to be excluded came into
clearest shape not long after legislators introduced a version of the bill
at the end of 1922, when labor leader Andrew Furuseth, then presi-
dent of the International Seamen's Union, persuaded his union and
the American Federation of Labor to oppose the law as it stood and
developed the opposition argument in a published analysis.115 The
analysis, which I explore more below, focused on power differentials:
how employee contracts mandating arbitration would be signed by
employees out of necessity and subject them to private processes that
lacked the protections of the judicial system and in which arbitrators
would be more interested in enforcing contract and property expecta-
tions than following and developing law.1 16
At the January 1923 legislative hearings, W.H.H. Piatt, who was
testifying as chairman of the Committee of Commerce, Trade and
Commercial Law of the ABA, alluded to Furuseth and the labor
movement's objections." 7 The committee indicated that it was aware
of Furuseth's objections,"18 which made sense because they had been
published, reflected the views of two powerful unions, and Furuseth
often appeared before Congress.119
Piatt clarified that the FAA was "not intended [to] be an act
referring to labor disputes, at all. It is purely an act to give . . .
merchants the right or the privilege" of arbitrating disputes.120 To
respond to labor's objection, Piatt recommended adding to the bill:
"but nothing herein contained shall apply to seamen or any class of
workers in interstate and foreign commerce."121 Shortly after, then-
115 See Finkin, supra note 18, at 284 (overviewing Furuseth's efforts to secure labor
support); Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual Convention of the International Seamen's
Union of America, 26 INr'L SEAMEN'S UNION Am., 83-89, 203-05 (1923) [hereinafter
Seamen's Union] (Furuseth's analysis).
116 Seamen's Union, supra note 115, at 83-89, 203-05 (1923); see also infra notes 140-42
and accompanying text.
117 Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal
Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9 (1923) [hereinafter 1923 Hearings].
118 Piatt referred to an objection from a "labor union," and Senator Sterling, who had
introduced the bill, replied, "Mr. Furuseth?" Id. Piatt replied: "Yes; some such name as
that." Id.
119 Finkin, supra note 18, at 284 (explaining that Furuseth "was a well-known and.
respected figure in Congress, having appeared before its committees and having actively
lobbied it for more than two decades").
120 1923 Hearings, supra note 117, at 10.
121 Id. at 9.
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Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover wrote a letter to Congress on
the subject, noting the labor movement's objection to the "inclusion of
workers' contracts" in the bill, urging the adoption of Piatt's verbiage,
and adding railroad employees to it.122 Hoover's letter was introduced
into both the 1923 and 1924 legislative hearings.1 23
When the FAA passed without a "nay" vote in 1925, becoming
law on the first day of the next year,1 24 the language introduced by
Piatt and slightly amended by Hoover became section 1's exception:
"but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment
of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged
in foreign or interstate commerce."1 25
Scholars focus on how this history demonstrates that Congress
intended to exclude all workers in interstate commerce within its reg-
ulatory authority from the statute's enforcement provisions, but my
effort is to understand something deeper about the exclusion's struc-
ture and meaning.1 26 Most generally, the exception must be under-
stood in the context of the era, a time when the "labor question" was
the central political issue of the day and when the government's ability
to regulate the economy and protect workers was perhaps the most
contested political battle.127 At a time when the federal government's
ability to protect workers was in dispute, the fact that the federal gov-
ernment took a step to protect workers by denying the extension of
the FAA to them says something about the framers' views of both the
federal goverment and its social welfare goals and how they relate to
public adjudication. Taking the exception in the text together with
other statements in the legislative history about social welfare reveals
something deeper about the inner logic of the FAA, and can provide
superior grounds within the statute for thinking about problematic
issues in arbitration today as they relate to power differentials and the
logic of regulation.
Thus, consider Senator Walsh's exchange, again with Piatt, at the
Senate Judiciary Committee hearings in 1923 in the context of
both the discussion around employee arbitration and labor struggles.
Senator Walsh began:
122 Id. at 14.
123 Joint Hearings, supra note 37, at 21; 1923 Hearings, supra note 117, at 14.
124 Moses, supra note 18, at 110.
125 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
126 Margaret Moses and Matthew Finkin offer path-breaking historical accounts of the
employment provisions of section 1 on which I build theoretically here. See Moses, supra
note 18, at 105-08. See generally Finkin, supra note 18.
127 See, e.g., ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 118 (1998) (exploring
how "the 'labor question' replaced the struggle over slavery as the dominant focus of
public life" as the economy industrialized).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
May 2018]1 275
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The trouble about the matter is that a great many of these contracts
that are entered into are really not voluntar[y] things at all. . . . It is
the same with a good many contracts of employment. A man says
"These are our terms. All right, take it or leave it." Well, there is
nothing for the man to do except to sign it; and then he surrenders
his right to have his case tried by the court, and has to have it tried
before a tribunal in which he has no confidence at all.128
Piatt responded that he "would not favor any kind of legislation
that would permit the forcing [of] a man to sign that kind [of] a con-
tract" and reiterated that the statute's intended end is arbitration
between merchants.1 29 Their exchange is illuminating, and not only
because Piatt is so emphatic in his response. Walsh was expressing a
view about how the model of contract was ill-suited to the labor con-
text in light of power disparities and about the superiority of public
adjudication, at a time when animosity between workers and courts
ran high.130 Though a union clearly might prefer labor arbitration
(which I discuss later and involves a substantially different power
dynamic from an individual employee arbitrating with a firm), he was
surmising that an individual employee would prefer a court of law.
At the Joint Hearings, the reasons one might prefer courts to
oversee arbitration were made clearer by Julius Cohen. Cohen had
been general counsel for the New York State Chamber of Commerce
and architect of the New York state arbitration act that served as the
model for the FAA1 31 and he was the principal architect of the FAA
and a reformer committed to arbitration as a progressive vehicle. 132
At the hearings, Cohen was faced with a question from Senator
Sterling about the revocability doctrine and its roots.'3 3 Cohen
128 1923 Hearings, supra note 117, at 9.
129 Id. at 10.
130 In large part, the complicated relationship between labor and courts traced back to
courts enjoining various forms of labor activity, including striking, protesting, and
picketing. For histories of the development of labor injunction practices and how workers
challenged and protested them, see generally WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE
SHAPING OF THE AMERIcAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1991); FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN
GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930); WILIAM G. Ross, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS,
PROGRESSIVES, AND THE LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937 (1994);
CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONs: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND
THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960, at 49-52 (1985).
131 See MACNEIL, supra note 33, at 28-43 (noting Cohen's view of and role in
developing arbitration law); Moses, supra note 18, at 101-12 (describing Cohen's
influential involvement in the rise of state arbitration law and in the construction of and
passage of the FAA).
132 Kessler, supra note 22, at 2949-52; see also SZALAI, supra note 58, at 42 (discussing
Cohen's history of accomplishments, his protection of workers, and his prominence in the
arbitration reform movement); Aragaki, supra note 28, at 1947.
133 See Joint Hearings, supra note 37, at 14.
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admitted that courts were not only jealous of their authority in
refusing to enforce arbitration agreements but also concerned that
"people were not able to take care of themselves in making contracts,
and the stronger men would take advantage of the weaker [in arbitra-
tion], and the courts had to come in and protect them."1 34 When
Senator Sterling queried in response about "take it or leave it" con-
tracts, Cohen's response was to say that the FAA would not extend to
such circumstances because the "Federal Government" was taking on
an increasingly important role in "protect[ing] everybody" through
legislation. 35 He referenced in passing one piece of legislation, the
Bills of Lading Act of 1909, and stated that the government would
protect parties both through such regulation and its "regularly consti-
tuted bodies," making it clear that he envisioned judicial or adminis-
trative enforcement of regulation at least vis-A-vis workers.1 36 Cohen
was thus not content to use the model of contract to hash the issue
out. Instead, he was expressing a theory of public regulation. Indeed,
Cohen, speaking in 1925 about worker arbitration, was elaborating
central components of the New Deal theory of the regulatory state a
decade early: In light of problematic economic power disparities,
Congress would take an active role in protecting workers and courts
and public processes would continue the endeavor through interpreta-
tion and implementation.1 37 It matters that this statement was made
when Congress was embedding one such exception in its federal arbi-
tration act, protecting individual workers from arbitration.
In the context of this notion that less powerful economic parties
would be protected by the state, one can better understand
the repeated and emphatic statements of congressmen about the
legislation's limitations. Thus, in analyzing statements such as
Representative Graham's on the House floor debate that the bill
"simply provides for one thing, and that is to give an opportunity to
enforce an agreement in commercial contracts and admiralty con-
tracts,"138 Margaret Moses is correct to assert that the FAA was "not
intended to permit a party with greater economic strength to compel a
weaker party to arbitrate."1 39 The contract and procedural reform
134 Id. at 14-15.
135 Id. at 15.
136 Id. In contrast, some progressive reformers believed that arbitration was the tool for
aiding groups like the poor and consumers. See generally Kessler, supra note 22.
137 See, e.g., Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94
B.U. L. REv. 669, 671 (2014) (overviewing FDR's view of how problematic accumulations
of economic power had built up and of the government's role in protecting workers and
citizens from such problematic economic power arrangements).
138 65 CONG. REc. 1931 (1924).
139 Moses, supra note 18, at 108.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
May 2018] 277
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
paradigms would cast these statements and section 1's protections as
concerning the ability to contract to arbitrate or about arbitration pro-
cess. These statements and section 1's protections, however, are less
about the ability to contract to arbitrate or about arbitration process
than the state's role in protecting certain economic parties from arbitra-
tion outright. They both define, and, in historical light, reflect the
beginnings of the federal government's commitment to publicly over-
seeing disputes between unorganized workers and firms and thereby,
through public process, protecting the former. In this way, they offer a
theory of regulation against which regulatory enforcement problems
today can be judged.
Indeed, Furuseth's published analysis of the proposed FAA,
which sparked the congressional dialogue at the root of section 1, con-
firms this understanding of section 1. In the analysis, Furuseth worried
that applying the FAA to individual workers would "take away from
[them] . . . the present right to a day in [c]ourt" and with it all of the
"procedure and constitutional guarantees" that exist in courts and
were designed to protect them. 1 4 0 As Matthew Finkin aptly puts it,
Furuseth "saw judges as public officers, charged with doing justice. He
saw arbitrators . . . as creatures of contracts unilaterally dictated by
employers, charged with enforcing the rights of property." 1 4 1
Furuseth thus predicted that, were the FAA to pass without the
exception for individual workers, workers would, "through [their]
necessities" and "because [they are] hungry," sign arbitration con-
tracts and "thus lose the right to the protection of the Courts with the
machinery, which ... civilization has built up around the perhaps oth-
erwise weak and defenseless."1 4 2 He worried that the arbitrator would
be more concerned with enforcing the contract and protecting
employers' property interests than with enforcing the law relating to
labor conditions, and indeed might be biased on behalf of the
employer, which would pay for the proceedings.1 43 Furuseth reflected
on the protections that certain workers had gained both through law
and from the federal government in instances such as the Seaman
140 Seamen's Union, supra note 116, at 203.
141 Finkin, supra note 18, at 288.
142 Seamen's Union, supra note 116, at 203-04.
143 See id. at 205 (noting that the arbitrator will believe "it is his duty to protect the
existing status" and will be "induce[d] ... to err ... on the side of the employer, because
half a loaf is better than no bread").
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Act1" and the Jones Act,1 45 and imagined them being lost through the
FAA.146
Through Furuseth's words and the legislative discussions, one can
begin to glean the deeper motivations for why section 1 would exclude
employees from the FAA. Reducing section 1 to issues of contract
formation or procedural efficiency misses its regulatory logic: that the
federal government, courts, and public process are instrumental to
protecting weaker parties in the evolving industrial order, and in
developing and evolving law to ensure that protection. Publicity is
essential to that theory. Thus, before Congress sets out an image of a
world of arm's length merchants contracting to privatize the process
of resolving their disputes in section 2, it first sets out an image of a
domain where the state has an essential role in overseeing how law is
applied to disputes involving parties with great economic power
disparities.
To better understand this congressional viewpoint, it is necessary
to understand how law had created those power disparities in the first
place.
B. Text in Context
In insisting that courts adjudicate disputes between individual
employees and employers due to the power disparity between them,
the leaders behind the FAA advanced views about both existing eco-
nomic power disparities in the market and the duty of the federal gov-
ernment-both Congress and courts-to regulate market ordering.
That is, they formed a view of both what the problem of economic
power differentials looked like and how the regulatory state would
respond.
Section 1 and its history are therefore best understood as expres-
sing a theory of political economyl 4 7 founded in Progressive-Era
144 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1994) (providing remedies for injured seamen). Furuseth had
played a leading role in agitating for and securing the passage of the legislation. See
HYMAN WEINTRAUB, ANDREw FURUSETH: EMANCIPATOR OF THE SEAMEN 108-32 (1959).
145 Ch. 153, § 20, 38 Stat. 1164, 1185 (1915) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. app. § 688
(1994)) (regulating the hours, wages, and safety of workers at sea).
146 See Seamen's Union, supra note 116, at 204 (warning that "rider" arbitration clauses
in labor contracts would void seamen's right to wages, food, and damages under the Jones
Act, as well as the right to "quit work in harbor").
147 By political economy, I refer to "the interrelationship between economics and
politics"-in this context, how democratic laws, institutions, and practices regulate,
influence, guide, and structure the economic system and relationships within it. Barry R.
Weingast & Donald A. Wittman, The Reach of Political Economy, in THE OxFORD
HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 3, 3 (Barry R. Weingast & Donald A. Wittman eds.,
2008); see also K. Sabeel Rahman, Domination, Democracy, and Constitutional Political
Economy in the New Gilded Age: Towards a Fourth Wave of Legal Realism?, 94 Tax. L.
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thought: they focus on how, in light of the development of economic
power relationships, the state had affirmative regulatory obligations to
use public process to protect less advantaged parties. The principle
that section 1 embodies relies on descriptive claims about how the
economy and economic relationships function and how law had struc-
tured each, as well as normative claims about the obligation of the
federal government and its legal institutions to regulate those relation-
ships and shift power back to its citizens.
The relationships that legislators and leaders in the charge for the
FAA refer to and their claims about duties of government were nested
in the wide-ranging Progressive-Era legal thinking at the time that had
its climax in the New Deal. Progressive reformers focused on how
conditions necessary for freedom of contract did not extend to the
relationships between individual workers and large industrial firms.
They also argued that in light of the law-created advantages of those
firms, the state had a responsibility to protect workers through regula-
tion. It is through the lens of this legal thinking that one can best theo-
retically unwind both the FAA framers' statements about economic
power and state intervention and the parity principle that they and
section 1's text together create.
1. The Economy
Begin with the descriptive claims in the FAA's legislative history
about economic disparities. First and most basically, the claims reflect
an understanding that Americans had become a nation of workers in
an evolving industrial economic order. With the Industrial Revolution,
the nation saw the decline of an agrarian system-where citizens were
thought to either live from their property or own small enterprises as
"citizen entrepreneurs"-and the rise of one in which the vast
majority of the nation's citizens had to become workers in enter-
prises.148 Indeed, large enterprises were becoming pervasive across
the economy. With the Industrial Revolution came "the growth of
giant, complex industrial enterprises in several industries, starting with
the railroads." 149 By the early 20th century, across a variety of
REv. 1329, 1332 (2016) (defining political economy as "how our politics and economics
relate to one another, how they are structured by law and institutions, and how they ought
to be structured in light of fundamental moral values").
148 See, e.g., TomurNs, supra note 130, at 148-96.
149 Harwell Wells, The Birth of Corporate Governance, 33 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 1247,
1253 (2010); see generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VismiL HAND: THE
MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERIcAN BusnrEss (1977) (describing the rise and
structure of modem corporations).
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industries, a few large firms controlled the market. 150
Second, in addition to Furuseth, leaders such as Senator Walsh
and Julius Cohen made claims about how economic power disparities
affected contracting within the new order. Far from the Supreme
Court's view of freedom of contract at the time, which assumed arm's
length contracting between workers and employers as an aspect of
their freedom,151 Senator Walsh's comment regarding "take it or leave
it" contracts 52 and Furuseth's reference to "hungry" workers who will
take whatever conditions the employer imposes1 53 were embedded in
a long-ranging progressive dialogue about economic power.
Progressives showed how "theoretic[al] freedom of contract ...
has no existence in fact" under circumstances where workers dealt
with powerful firms.1 54 As John Dewey put it in The Public and Its
Problems, social legislation for workers does not violate freedom of
contract protections because "the economic resources of the parties to
the arrangement are so disparate that the conditions of a genuine con-
tract are absent; action by the state is introduced to form a level on
which bargaining takes place." 55 Indeed, some took the view that the
development of a rosier view of freedom of contract-much like the
one the Supreme Court subscribes to in its current arbitration juris-
prudence-"was a judicial answer to the demands of industrialists in
the period of business expansion following the Civil War."1 56
Progressives understood that the nascent and developing
"freedom of contract" rationale for limiting government intervention
into economic relationships to protect workers was in part a descrip-
tive theory of economic relationships, and at that rate, a poor one.
150 See, e.g., Wells, supra note 149, at 1253 ("By the mid-1910s, a few giant 'center firms'
dominated many sectors of the American economy and maintained their preeminence for
decades."); see also Walton Hamilton, The Problem of Anti-Trust Reform, 32 COLUM. L.
REv. 173, 174 (1932) (noting the rise of firms that had come to be "of unprecedented size
and power").
151 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (concluding that a New York
law limiting the hours of bakery workers interfered with the "freedom" of employers and
employees "to contract with each other in relation to their employment").
152 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
153 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
154 Louis M. Greeley, The Changing Attitude of the Courts Toward Social Legislation, 5
U. ILL. L. REV. 222, 223 (1910).
155 JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMs 62 (1927); see also RIcHARD T. ELY,
STUDIES IN THE EVOLUTION OF INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 406 (1903) ("[C]oercion ... is largely
due to the unequal strength of those who make a contract, for back of contract lies
inequality in strength of those who form the contract. Contract does not change existing
inequalities and forces, but is simply the medium through which they find expression.").
156 CLYDE E. JACOBS, LAW, WRITERS, AND THE COURTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THOMAS
M. COOLEY, CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, AND JOHN F. DILLON UPON AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 24 (1954).
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Listen to Roscoe Pound, asking a series of questions whose answers,
he says, should be evident "[t]o everyone acquainted at first hand with
actual industrial conditions":
Why ... do courts persist in the fallacy [of freedom of contract]?
Why do so many of them force upon legislation an academic theory
of equality in the face of practical conditions of inequality? Why do
we find a great and learned court in 1908 taking the long step into
the past of dealing with the relation between employer and
employee in railway transportation, as if the parties were individ-
uals-as if they were farmers haggling over the sale of a horse? Why
is the legal conception of the relation of employer and employee so
at variance with the common knowledge of mankind?' 57
One prominent contract scholar, answering these very questions
and sounding very much like Senator Walsh, put it thus: "There is, in
fact, no real bargaining between the modern large employer (say the
United States Steel Corporation) and its individual employees. The
working-man has no real power to negotiate or confer with the corpo-
ration as to the terms under which he will agree to work."s58 These
claims about contract also became claims about social welfare,
because the inability of workers to control their wages or working
conditions affected their welfare. Thus, as William Forbath explains,
"[g]rowing concentrations of wealth and power in the new giant cor-
porations" were linked to "widening class inequalities" and "low
wages."1 59
2. The Political Economy
These descriptive claims lead to a final claim, this one normative,
that is also reflected in the FAA hearings: that in light of these wide
power imbalances, the state should intervene to rebalance the scales,
or as FAA architect Cohen put it, to "protect" workers.1 60 Section 1's
exclusion of workers from the FAA's coverage embodies a worker-
protective view of the role of Congress and courts in protecting the
parties that had been disadvantaged by the rise of industrialism.
Cohen's view of the state's responsibility and section 1's embodi-
ment of it can be understood through a progressive vision of reform.
157 Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 454 (1909).
158 Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARv. L. REv. 553, 569 (1933).
159 William E. Forbath, The Distributive Constitution and Workers' Rights, 72 Omuo Sr.
L.J. 1115, 1125 (2011) [hereinafter Forbath, The Distributive Constitution]; see also William
E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 28-29 (1999)("[I]ncreasing concentration of ownership of resources and capital" had factory workers
"competing against new machines and new unskilled and underpaid workers" and the
proprietors of these factories "demand[ed] longer and longer hours.").
160 See Joint Hearings, supra note 37, at 14-15.
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For some reformers, it was the state's role in creating these unequal
conditions that produced this obligation. Robert Lee Hale was per-
haps most incisive among them. Hale articulated how the government
was complicit in creating unequal bargaining conditions through
legally constructing the market.161 Under his account, the state aided
the development of corporate power by protecting it through property
and contract law. These laws provided owners with title to the prod-
ucts that laborers worked to produce, and then required workers to
pay to consume those products on the market.162 Workers, rather than
having a claim to the ownership of the product their labor produced,
negotiated for wages.1 63 The system thus required workers to both sell
their labor for wages and to purchase the products made through such
arrangements for consumption and subsistence with wages.1 64
For Hale, this structure diminished the relative freedom of
workers, who needed to sell their labor in bargaining transactions with
employers. The low wages and poor working conditions of workers
merely "reflect[ed] the low degree of compulsion [the worker could]
bring to the bargaining process, as compared to the compulsion
brought to bear by the employer."1 65 And precisely because "the law
endows [the employer] with rights that are more advantageous than
those with which it endows [the worker]," bargaining did not approxi-
mate anything like the supposed ideal of freedom of contract.166 Hale
argued that government intervention created the imbalance in power,
and government intervention could be applied positively to correct
161 See ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF PRIVATE
GOVERNING POWER (1952) (exploring both the government's role in creating conditions of
coercion in the market as well as its interest in adjusting the imbalances it created); Robert
L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. Sci. Q. 470
(1923) (discussing government action inherent in protection of private property rights);
Robert L. Hale, Law Making by Unofficial Minorities, 20 COLUM. L. REv. 451 (1920); see
also Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 603
(1943) [hereinafter Hale, Economic Liberty]. For additional analysis of Hale's ideas, see
BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND
TI-IE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENr 12 (1998) (expounding Hale's view); and
Warren J. Samuels, The Economy as a System of Power and its Legal Bases: The Legal
Economics of Robert Lee Hale, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 261, 262-63 (1973) (analyzing, among
other things, how Hale's writing focused on "the structure and diffusion of the distribution
of power, the role of the state in determining and changing the structure of private
economic power, and the question, to which (or whose) interests should the state be
responsive"); Forbath, The Distributive Constitution, supra note 159, at 1132 (discussing
how progressives and legal realists framed the "public, legally constructed character of
private economic power").
162 See, e.g., Hale, Economic Liberty, supra note 161, at 605.
163 See id.
164 See id.
165 Id. at 627.
166 See id. at 627-28.
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it.167 The state had "intervene[ed]" on behalf of firms, augmenting
their property and contract rights, and because workers' ability to
exercise power over contracts was limited, Hale viewed it as
appopriate for the state to intervene on behalf of workers as well.168
Another leading scholar similarly argued that the state, in
enforcing contracts, augmented the power of the firm, and that to put
no restriction on freedom of contract would necessarily lead the state
to enforce unconscionable or exploitative agreements.1 69 In other
words, it would be nonsensical to use the fiction of arm's length con-
tracts to impede the state from regulating to protect workers and con-
sumers. Thus, at a minimum, although the power of the state was used
to enforce contracts, it should not be used "for unconscionable pur-
poses, such as helping those who exploit the dire need or weaknesses
of their fellows."1 70 At this point, the thesis sounds in the register of
the contract paradigm. But the author continues that more positive
intervention by the government was also required, because state non-
interference into market arrangements as they existed would just
redouble the advantages that the regimes of property and contract
had created for employers, making freedom of contract anything but
free for workers. 171 The government's interventions on behalf of
workers were therefore "as necessary to real liberty as traffic restric-
tions are necessary to assure real freedom in the general use of our
highways. "172
Like Furuseth and Cohen, progressives thus viewed law as
playing an essential role in correcting inequalities that the legal
167 See id. at 628.
168 See id. (explaining that, as "unplanned" government intervention contributed to
what progressives viewed as a breakdown in true freedom of contract, "planned"
government intervention could fairly be employed to restore it).
169 See Cohen, supra note 158, at 587 (explaining that contract law solidifies the power
of one party over another by placing government resources at their disposal); see also ELY,
supra note 155 (arguing that contract law reinforces existing inequalities).
170 Cohen, supra note 158, at 587.
171 See id. (noting that government non-intervention "would logically lead not to a
maximum of individual liberty but to contracts of slavery, into which, experience shows,
men will 'voluntarily' enter under economic pressure-a pressure that is largely
conditioned by the laws of property").
172 Id. Cohen argued further that the norm of state non-intervention into the
relationships on freedom of contract arguments was itself novel, because through the end
of the eighteenth century the government regulated master-servant law. It was "only after
the Civil War that the United States Supreme Court invented the doctrine that the 'right to
contract' is property and is thus protected against real government regulation by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments of our Federal Constitution." Id. at 569-70 (emphasis in
original).
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accommodation of industrialism had created or magnified. 173 As
Barbara Fried puts it, progressives believed that since law and the
state were "unavoidably constitutive of economic life . . . one should
make a virtue of necessity, by turning the government into a positive
force in the economy."1 74 She notes that Hale believed the primary
goal of government was to better the conditions of citizens and to
maximize the aggregate freedom enjoyed by society as a whole.175
Given this purpose and since the "current balance of bargaining
power strongly favored employers over labor, a government policy
directed towards maximizing freedom [should] use its own coercive
weapons to tilt the balance of power more towards labor."1 76 Hale
also believed, as clearly did the reformers behind the FAA, that eco-
nomic life was rooted in law: that courts and legislators had an essen-
tial role in enforcing promises, structuring contractual arrangements,
and in shifting power balances.1 77
The progressive approach to shifting power back to workers
through legislation was justified not only by a different view of market
power relationships but also a set of social welfare reasons for doing
so. These reasons help to explain why the state would come to protect
workers, as did the FAA reformers. For some, the line between eco-
nomic life and political life was fuzzy or fictive, such that providing
workers with more power or supporting "industrial democracy" was
part and parcel of sustaining our democratic system. 78 For others still,
it was merely the case that government had an obligation to ensure
the welfare of its citizens. Under this view, in a system where the
workers who made up the backbone of the country enjoyed so little
power over their wages, working hours, safety, and conditions, the
state needed to intervene to shift power back to them and, as Cohen
said during the FAA hearings, protect them.179 For others who held
173 For accounts of how progressives viewed positive government intervention, see, for
example, T.H. Green, Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract, in LIBERTY 21 (David
Miller ed., 1991) (explaining how interferences with freedom of contract support freedom
in its true sense), RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R.
5-6, 227, 240, 254 (1955) (tracing Progressive economic reform efforts), and GEORGE E.
MowRY, THE ERA OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE BIRTH OF MODERN AMERICA
1900-1912, at 41-42, 81-82 (1958).
174 FRIED, supra note 161, at 11-12.
175 See id. at 4 (describing Hale's views of the proper role of government); id. at 46
(describing Hale's view of maximizing the aggregate liberty of society).
176 Id. at 68.
177 See id. at 71, 79-84 (expounding Hale's view of political economy).
178 See Forbath, The Distributive Constitution, supra note 159, at 1125-32 (overviewing
how Brandeis and other progressive reformers rejected a sharp line between the economic
and political spheres).
179 See supra note 135 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., FLORENCE KELLEY, SOME
ETHICAL GAINs THROUGH LEGISLATION (1905), reprinted in THE CITIZEN's LIBRARY OF
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this view and some who did not, the accumulation of corporate power
raised the specter that such economic power would bleed into political
power, creating an oligarchy, and this threat justified counterbal-
ancing that power. 80 One could thus view section 1 not only as a
statement about political economy, but also as one about what
William Forbath and Joseph Fishkin have called constitutional polit-
ical economy.18 That is, one could understand arbitration to be a
form of economic governance that results in the economic domination
of citizens-domination of the kind that is constitutionally impermis-
sible in part because it may bleed into political domination.182
Thus, whatever the underlying motivation, the concern was that
allowing the parties whom our legal system had already privileged to
force the weaker to "contract out" of public process would remove the
state from its role in policing economic arrangements and making
them compatible with constitutional or public values. The state had
already left so much of governance to the private domain. To redouble
that private power by not providing a safety valve out of the private
domain for dispute resolution and rights-establishment would swell
private economic governance too much, forcing less powerful parties
to enter a privatized process that would lack the benefits of public
EcoNoMIcs, POLITICS, AND SOCIOLOGY (Richard T. Ely ed., 1910) (exploring how
legislation such as child labor and minimum wage laws would improve the welfare of the
nation's citizens).
180 See, e.g., Franklin D. Roosevelt, Acceptance of the Renomination for the Presidency
(June 27, 1936), in 5 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
230, 233 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1938) ("[T]he political equality we once had won was
meaningless in the face of economic inequality. A small group had concentrated into their
own hands an almost complete control over other people's property, other people's money,
other people's labor-other people's lives. . . . [L]ife was no longer free; liberty no longer
real .... ).
181 See, e.g., Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, Wealth, Commonwealth, and the
Constitution of Opportunity, 58 NOMOS (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 2) (on file
with author) ("[A]rguments about constitutional political economy begin from the
premises that economics and politics are inextricable, and that our constitutional order
rests on and presupposes a political-economic order.").
182 See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 1 (1985) (noting the
American consensus "that a well-ordered society would require ... political liberty[] and
economic liberty"); FONER, supra note 127, at 9 (claiming that since the Revolution it has
been "an axiom" in American constitutional thought that "political freedom" and a decent
measure of "economic independence" are both required); Jon D. Michaels, Note, To
Promote the General Welfare: The Republican Imperative to Enhance Citizenship Welfare
Rights, 11 YALE L.J. 1457 (2002) (delineating the historical and theoretical relationship
between socioeconomic resources and the American civic republican constitutional order).
See generally K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION (2017)
(explaining the progressive theory of democratic economic governance and its application
to modem politics and economics); Fishkin & Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution,
supra note 137, at 671 (asserting that the anti-oligarchy principle is fundamental to our
constitutional order and should be recovered as a constitutional argument).
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process and therefore likely inure more to the benefit of the stronger
party. Private governance of that kind, by nearly fully removing the
state when parties of such power disparity resolved disputes, would be
too synonymous with the kind of domination that was constitutionally
unallowable. It would also simply remove the state from its counter-
balancing role established for social welfare reasons.
The role of courts in this counterbalancing or protecting may
seem more complicated. Progressives, after all, critiqued Lochner-era
courts; so one may wonder, why protect employees by insisting on
public adjudication? The answer is that the fact that courts needed to
be improved had to be weighed against privatized process under con-
ditions of vastly unequal economic power. While, for example, courts
had been critiqued by progressives in the decades around the enact-
ment of the FAA for their decisions in labor injunction casesIs3 and
for developing freedom-of-contract substantive due process jurispru-
dence,'8 these issues were not a mark against public adjudication
compared to private arbitration when such inequalities of power were
involved. Indeed, in a way, the troubled histories of these issues may
prove the point about public adjudication's virtues compared to arbi-
tration. Consider labor injunctions. The public and reasoned nature of
judges' labor decisions allowed the appellate process to work, mobil-
ized citizens and reformers to challenge judges' interpretations of
labor activity, and ultimately sparked legislative reform in the Norris-
La Guardia Act. 85 A similar process occurred with the legislative and
judicial transformation in freedom-of-contract substantive due process
cases. 18 6 The courts' forays, if anything, helped shift the balance
183 See supra note 130.
184 For histories of the rise and fall of freedom-of-contract substantive due process,
whether through doctrinal development or political and constitutional transformation, see
2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEoPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); DAVID E. BERNSTEIN,
ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS: AFRICAN AMERICANS, LABOR REGULATIONS & THE
COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL (2001); BARRY CUSHMAN,
RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT (1998); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION
BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE
(1993); PAUL KENS, JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM POLITICS: THE ANATOMY OF
LOCHNER V. NEW YORK (1990). See also Jack M. Balkin, "Wrong the Day it Was Decided":
Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REv. 677, 686-88 (2005); Cass R.
Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873 (1987).
185 Pub. L. No. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. H§ 101-115
(1994)). I have overviewed this process elsewhere. See Luke P. Norris, Labor and the
Origins of Civil Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. REv. 462, 499-508 (2017) (discussing the
evolution and structure of the Norris-La Guardia Act, which limited and defined the
courts' jurisdiction when issuing injunctions in labor disputes in order to address
bargaining power disparities).
186 See supra note 184.
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towards administrative agencies-sometimes acting alone, at others in
combination with courts, but all through public processes.
Along the way, reformers such as Furuseth never lost faith in
courts generally. And the legislators who listened to his and Hoover's
concerns did not once make an argument that private arbitration for
individual workers was superior to public adjudication. Indeed, it was
not only the case, as Furuseth's comments reflect, that courts would
interpret statutes designed to protect employees in ways that were
subject to public oversight. Some progressive procedural reformers
had even more ambitious views of what improving courts could do for
workers and other parties in shifting power back to them.187
Taking all of this together, then, one can see how the text and
legislative history of the FAA sound in the register of progressive the-
orists, echoing their view of market relationships and advancing the
evolving commitment of the federal government to protecting
workers. What is so critical-and what existing accounts do not cap-
ture-is that the prohibition against employee arbitration is both
about economic power disparities and part of a broader theory of
political economy that would come to define the rise of the modern
state in the New Deal. The parity principle, brought into the legisla-
tive discussions by labor leaders, is rooted in the American experience
with industrial capitalism and in a regulatory vision of the role of law
and public adjudication in correcting capitalism's imbalances for dif-
fuse parties, and principally in the New Deal model, workers.
The problem then cannot be reduced to contract formation or the
efficiency of arbitral process. The role of the state in overseeing and
adjudicating both the power struggles between institutionalized firms
and diffuse economic parties and in interpreting the laws designed to
protect them is essential to the American legal reckoning with indus-
trial capitalism of which section 1 of the FAA is part. Publicity is an
indispensable pillar of that compromise because counterbalancing as a
function of the state requires it to oversee disputes and interpret,
187 One leading progressive reformer, Charles Clark, thought that courts could hear
claims with no basis in positive law-such as those arising out of the evolving conditions in
the workplace-and decide cases in an equitable, flexible manner to do "justice" for the
party. See, e.g., Emily Sherwin, The Jurisprudence of Pleading: Rights, Rules, and Conley v.
Gibson, 52 How. L.J. 73, 84 (2008) (exploring how Charles Clark "believed that a plaintiff
with a compelling story should be able to bring it before a judge and ask for justice").
Another leading reformer, Homer Cummings, thought that public adjudication could shift
power back to the "sometimes forgotten people" in the American system by allowing
courts to hear their claims in a flexible manner modeled on equity. See Homer Cummings,
Speech Before the Federal Bar Council (June 1938) (transcript available in the Papers of
Homer Stille Cummings, Albert and Shirley Small Special Collections Library, University
of Virginia, Box 208).
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develop, and put parties on notice about the reach of its protective
law. It is in this way that section 1 of the FAA and its parity principle
prefigure the rise of the New Deal legal order.
Section 1 therefore elaborates a principle that is useful above and
beyond employer-employee cases, especially as the economy devel-
oped in a way that maintained large firms and, beyond unionized
workers, deep inequalities of bargaining power between employees
and consumers on the one side and firms on the other. The economy
then or now is not the one that some progressive reformers, such as
Louis Brandeis, sought to summon, in which large firms would be
broken up because of the dangers to democracy from vesting so much
power in them.s88
Indeed, there is an important point there: The economy that
Brandeis wanted the country to return to is one of small trade associa-
tions and merchants; the economy that is the model of section 2 of the
FAA. In a world of small trade associations and merchants, arbitra-
tion might function as the norm. But Brandeis lost that battle, and the
world that came instead is one of large enterprises, citizen-workers,
mass-consumers, and contracts involving vastly unequal economic
power. That is, the world carved off by the logic and theory of section
1. Once we develop the principle of section 1, once we understand
how it seeks to close off from arbitration disputes between parties in
that world because of the state's role in correcting power imbalances,
we can see how the evolution of the American economy narrows the
world to which the FAA's logic applies. Of course, the Supreme Court
instead has expanded that world. It has not hurt the Court's efforts
that commentators have not developed a theory of section 1 to
counter its ever-growing contract theory of section 2.
C Advantages and Objections
Having explored the history and theory of the parity principle, it
is now possible to consider and weigh its advantages and some of the
objections that may be levied against the account I have offered.
The parity principle's advantages mirror the disadvantages of the
other paradigms. The contract paradigm limits courts to a world
where the question is whether an agreement to arbitrate was made
and whether contractual defenses can be established. It can tell us
little about the reasons, beyond failed agreement, that Congress
wanted to limit arbitration. The parity principle reminds us that ine-
188 See generally Louis D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS
PAPERS OF Louis D. BRANDEIS (Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., 1934) (promoting the concept
of industrial democracy and the importance of equal bargaining power between parties).
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quality of bargaining power in contract was only one part of the
problem of political economy that the state needed to solve during the
early-mid twentieth century. The question was not merely whether an
agreement had been struck, but a deeper one about the role of law in
both creating an unequal playing field for workers and in intervening
to equalize the field. This is the logic of much of the regulatory law
that arbitration today weakens. In this way, the parity principle
defines both the problem of power differentials and offers a regula-
tory theory to counter it and to critique the regulatory enforcement
problem.
This history shows that the denial of arbitration where parity was
lacking therefore was only in part about the less powerful party's
ability to agree to arbitrate. It was more so about recognizing the pre-
existing, law-structured power differential that required the active
presence, protection, and oversight of the state in resolving disputes
between more and less powerful parties. Thus, even where a decision
within arbitration might resolve the dispute on the merits, satisfying
the procedural reform paradigm, this was insufficient. Even a color-
able decision on the merits, say,- interpreting a worker-protective
statute may be insufficient if it would not allow the parties a right to
appeal it, provide the public with the information to organize to
amend the statute if it did not serve workers sufficiently, or provide
other firms with notice of what the law requires. The key point is that
the government was regulating great power disparities in an economic
system and apportioning the rights between workers and firms in part
through litigation. This is why the FAA was litigation-promoting for
parties where parity was so lacking.
It is worth noting in this vein that the parity principle is motivated
differently than the unconscionability doctrine, which the contract
paradigm largely relies on to limit arbitration's reach. In a somewhat
stylized manner, one might think of unconscionability as epitomizing
contract law's classical focus on securing and arranging the interests of
individuals by denying contract enforcement where interests are too
slanted. In contrast, the parity principle can be thought of as being
rooted in a historical "penetration of public law into the domain of
private law"189 that is founded more on an ideal of distributive justice
than securing the interests of individuals.'" Thus, the parity principle
is not only concerned with the wills of the parties, but also serves a
larger goal, through judicial reasoning and publicity and statutory
189 Roscoe Pound, Public Law and Private Law, 24 CORNELL L. REV. 469, 471 (1939)
(quoting GUSTAv RADBRUCH, RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 122 (1932)).
190 See id. at 470-73 (describing these theoretical foundations of the regulatory state).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 93:249290
THE PARITY PRINCIPLE
interpretation, of counterbalancing corporate power and shifting
power back to diffuse economic parties in order to ensure their social
welfare. It is founded on an ideal of regulation rather than privatiza-
tion. That ideal, in turn, shapes its ability to circumscribe arbitration
law.
I should pause to clarify, however, that my argument is not that
the parity principle is the way to understand the FAA. 191 I am con-
vinced that the contract and procedural reform paradigms are legiti-
mate interpretive models for understanding the statute, whatever their
limitations. The most interesting work to be done interpretively
involves negotiating the interplay of the paradigms and the prin-
ciple. 192 One stylized way of viewing the interplay is as follows: The
parity principle tells courts and legislators the most about the logic of
where arbitration is to be denied outright. The contract paradigm
hones in on questions of consent and contractual defenses for parties
where the parity differential is not significant enough to deny arbitra-
tion outright. Where consent and relative parity have been estab-
lished, the procedural reform paradigm allows courts to ask whether
arbitration will actually aid parties in getting to a merits decision. At
times, however, the paradigms can overlap as well, serving double
functions: for example, Hiro Aragaki has argued that the procedural
reform paradigm supports a stronger unconscionability approach.193
Similarly, one can imagine a more liberal unconscionability approach
honing in on questions of economic power at the heart of the parity
principle.
Having explored some of the advantages of the parity principle, it
is worth considering a few potential objections. I consider three objec-
tions, which go, respectively, to the limits of the account of parity, to
the effect of intervening circumstances, and to the potential conflict
between my account and the development of labor arbitration.
191 See Aragaki, supra note 28, at 1990 ("To the extent it is possible to talk coherently
about congressional intent at all [in the passage of the FAA], that intent was likely complex
and perhaps even contradictory, reflecting the support of diverse interest groups that each
wanted different things out of a new federal arbitration law.").
192 See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process,
1994 Wis. L. REV. 631, 632 (arguing that scholars should focus on "the relationship among"
procedural changes).
193 Unconscionability is viewed not only as a contract defense but also an "equitable
safety valve[ ]" that provides judges with "ex post discretion to set aside even well-
intentioned contractual directives when they end up interfering with" reaching a. merits
decision. Aragaki, supra note 28, at 2021-22.
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1. The Limits of Purpose
First, one might object that the parity principle relies too much on
legislative history and purpose to build up an account that spans
beyond the terse text of section 1. The contract and procedural reform
paradigms are also susceptible to this critique. The contract paradigm
relies on the text of section 2 and an equally sparse legislative his-
tory.1 94 And the procedural reform paradigm also relies on scattered
statements in the legislative history that are consonant with a proce-
dural simplification message and on the fact that later sections in the
statute-such as sections 4 and 5-reflect an impulse to simplify pro-
cess.1 95 Each paradigm, then, is both rooted in text and legislative his-
tory but must contend with the scarcity of both.
Debates about purpose, of course, are most salient in the context
of judicial interpretation of the statute. I will argue in Part III.A that
my account is useful for interpreting the scope of section 1's worker
exclusion. Since many interpreters have found the text of section 1 to
be unclear, the legislative history and context offer resources for judi-
cial interpretation. As Hart and Sacks, the most influential proponents
of purposivist analysis, asserted, when the text is not clear, materials
like legislative history, context, and shared background understand-
ings help to narrow and hone in on the range of meanings.1 96 Some
textualists also turn to such materials when the text is not clear.1 97
Thus, the turn to these materials helps interpreters to understand and
narrow the range of meanings that one can attribute to section 1. For
example, one could view section 1 as being only about maritime and
railroad workers, or about preserving industrial peace, or reflecting
the presumption that most workers would be in unions and covered by
and protected by labor union arbitration. But the legislative history
narrows the range of meanings and reveals the logic of why the FAA
framers fashioned a broad exclusion for workers.
194 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
195 See Aragaki, supra note 28, at 1973-88 (discussing those who advocated for the FAA
because its simpler procedural requirements allowed the administration of justice and
suggesting that sections 4 and 5 of the FAA support the theory that the statute was created
with the goal of procedural simplicity).
196 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw 1375-76 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey eds., 1994). Text still plays a central role in purposivist analysis. Id. at 1375 ("The
words of a statute, taken in their context, serve both as guides in the attribution of general
purpose and as factors limiting the particular meanings that can properly be attributed.").
197 See, e.g., John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM.
L. REv. 70, 84-85 (2006) (explaining that, when faced with ambiguous text, textualists will
consider a statute's overall purpose by examining the structure, title, or mischief being
addressed, although textualists often still find legislative history unreliable).
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It is also worth noting generally that purposivist analysis is perva-
sive and perhaps unavoidable in the FAA context. David Horton
argues that the Supreme Court engages in purposivist analysis in
interpreting the FAA and is justified in so doing.1 98 For example, the
Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion turned to the
FAA's "purposes and objectives" to ask whether it preempted the
California unconscionability doctrine at issue in the case.1 99 The Court
focused on "accomplish[ing] . . . the FAA's objectives" by under-
standing "[t]he overarching purpose of the FAA." 200 Horton
embraces this purposive analysis, although he argues that the Court
got the statute's purposes wrong in the case by reading a stronger
intent to preempt state law than the legislative history suggests. 201
While Horton limits his embrace of FAA purposive analysis to
the case before him-preemption-he also recognizes that there are
more general reasons for engaging in purposive analysis of the statute
in ways that are convincing. For example, he notes that the FAA
"requires judges to adapt the legislative blueprint to nine decades'
worth of new developments. . . . When circumstances have changed
since a statute's enactment, slavish devotion to the text can produce
unintended consequences." 2 0 2 Purposive analysis, by focusing on the
general purposes of lawmakers, especially in interpreting a statute
with terse text, can better "bend with the times." 203 In addition, again,
one might simply say that it is justified because the text of the statute
is not always clear and purposive analysis can draw one closer to con-
gressional intent. 204
The Court's purposive analysis is thus, to my mind, justifiable.
Indeed, I think that the Court's purposive analysis of the FAA
arguably goes further than Horton suggests, because the Court reads
section 2's contract paradigm to be the centerpiece of the FAA,
198 David Horton, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, Purposivism, and State Public
Policy, 101 GEO. L.J. 1217, 1223 (2013) (stating that, because the FAA is only meant to
preempt state rules that subvert its goals and policies, "preemption should hinge on what
lawmakers wanted to accomplish with the statute, not a hypertechnical parsing of its text").
199 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
200 Id. at 343--44.
201 See Horton, supra note 198, at 1223 ("But unlike Justice Scalia's cursory analysis in
Concepcion, a searching examination of the FAA's 'purposes and objectives' reveals that
Congress did not intend to preempt state public policy wholesale." (quoting Concepcion,
563 U.S. at 352)).
202 Id. at 1248-49.
203 Id. at 1249.
204 See Manning, supra note 197, at 87 n.60 (referencing statements by Supreme Court
Justices known for advocating a purposivist approach that reveal their concerns with solely
analyzing the literal meaning of text).
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imputing its overarching purpose to be to enforce contracts. 205 How-
ever, like Horton, I think that the Court's incorrect reading of that
purpose-or inflating of its import-is not a mark against employing a
purposive analysis. The statute's terse text on its face simply does not
allow courts to resolve all of the FAA disputes that come before them,
and turning to other materials is justified.
2. Changed Circumstances
Second, one might argue that, whatever the views of the FAA's
framers, circumstances have changed in the near century intervening
since its enactment, and in a modern economy factors such as the cost
of litigation and the need for efficient procedures justify the shift
towards more expansive use of arbitration. This argument works in
favor of dynamic interpretation of the FAA, and I should note that
scholars who favor dynamic interpretation view its applicability on a
continuum and tether its strongest application to circumstances where
"neither the text nor the historical context of the statute clearly
resolves the interpretive question, and the societal and legal context of
the statute has changed materially." 2 0 6 Thus, if we are in a world
where purposive interpretation can work by elucidating text and con-
text, overriding those interpretive conclusions in favor of considera-
tions of "present societal, political, and legal context" 207 may well be
less than entirely justified. And the point of the contract and proce-
dural reform paradigms and the parity principle is that in many
instances they allow courts to interpret the statute faithfully.
Even putting these considerations aside, I am not persuaded that
the present context undercuts the vitality of the parity principle.
Instead, it reflects its continuing importance. The arguments that
questions of parity are overridden or eclipsed by intervening develop-
ments are of two flavors. The first kind of argument concerns the
problems with public adjudication, and the second, the advantages of
arbitration in the modern economy.
According to the first, there has been a "litigation explosion" in
federal district courts, as parties pursued more claims, with ever costly
discovery, making public adjudication ever more cumbersome. 208
205 See supra notes 30-32; see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985) (declaring that section 2 and its emphasis on enforcing
contracts are the "centerpiece" of the FAA).
206 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479,
1496 (1987).
207 Id. at 1479.
208 Marc Galanter, The Turn Against Law: The Recoil Against Expanding
Accountability, 81 TEX. L. REV. 285, 292 (2002) (quoting Macklin Fleming, Court Survival
in the Litigation Explosion, 54 J. JUDICATURE 109, 109 (1970).
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These claims have been well responded to in the civil procedure litera-
ture. Scholars have cast serious doubt on this notion of a "litigation
explosion," arguing for example that there was a decline in per capita
litigation in the first half of the twentieth century, 209 that the per-
ceived rise in tort litigation (which was the hook for much of the claim
of an explosion) was overstated or non-existent, and that in some
areas of law, there was a modest rise in litigation rates, although with
most cases settling and many parties with valid claims choosing not to
bring them.210 Claims about the cost of discovery have also been
shown to be drastically overstated; indeed, the most comprehensive
data show that discovery costs have been stable and add up to a few
hours in most cases.211
As Stephen Burbank and Sean Farhang have showed, however,
there was beginning in the 1960s an increase of "private lawsuits to
enforce federal statutes."Z12 This increase resulted from a "legislative
choice to rely on private litigation in statutory implementation," or
what the scholars refer to as a "private enforcement regime" (as con-
trasted with or often coupled with an administrative enforcement
regime). 213 The combination of this private enforcement regime, an
expanded class action rule in 1966,214 and the "broad highway created
by the 1938 Federal Rules," 215 which simplified procedure and made it
easier for parties to bring claims and access discovery, contributed to a
rise in litigation in which private parties enforced federal laws.2 16
Thus, the increase of litigation was the result of an active political
choice. Burbank and Farhang show how that very rise was met with a
209 Id. at 285-87.
210 See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and
Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious
Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 61-62 (1983); Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote
to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REv. 1093, 1103 (1996).
211 See, e.g., Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform:
Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L. REv. 1085, 1088-89 (2012); A. Benjamin Spencer,
Pleading and Access to Civil Justice: A Response to Twiqbal Apologists, 60 UCLA L. REv.
1710, 1729-30 (2013).
212 Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach,
162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 1547 (2014).
213 Id. at 1547-48 (emphasis omitted) (quoting SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION
STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAwsuTs IN THE U.S. 19-60 (2010)).
214 See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARV. L. REv. 356, 375-400 (1967); Arthur R.
Miller, The Preservation and Rejuvenation of Aggregate Litigation: A Systemic Imperative,
64 EMORY L.J. 293, 294 (2014).
215 Burbank & Farhang, supra note 212, at 1587.
216 Id. at 1586-87.
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relatively unsuccessful conservative legislative backlash, 217 and more
successful conservative judicial backlash, where the Supreme Court
has rolled back private enforcement.218 It has done so, in part, by
raising hurdles to forming class actions, heightening pleading require-
ments, and importantly, expanding arbitration. 219
One can glean a few conclusions for the parity principle from the
contextualized history that Burbank and Farhang offer. The first is
that the very state that had, according to progressive reformers, disad-
vantaged diffuse economic parties such as workers vis-h-vis firms
came to rely on those less powerful parties to use litigation to regulate
those more powerful firms through acting as "private attorney
generals." Today, this regulation must occur in an economic context
where corporate power is concentrating 220 and worker and consumer
power imbalances vis-A-vis firms remain wide, as consumer bargaining
power has reduced in important wayS2 2 1 and workers increasingly lack
217 Id. at 1587. Some legislative victories include the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, and the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005. See Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (setting heightened pleading standard for federal securities
cases); Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
11, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.) (limiting federal courts' discretion in remedies concerning
prisoner litigation); Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.) (imposing new requirements on diversity jurisdiction and amount in
controversy for certain class action claims).
218 Burbank & Farhang, supra note 212, at 1586-87.
219 Id. at 1603-06.
220 Corporate concentration levels are said to be at their highest levels today, with many
industries being controlled by just a few firms. E.g., Council of Economic Advisers, Issue
Brief on Benefits of Competition and Indicators of Market Power (Apr. 2016), https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/
20160414_ceascompetition issuebrief.pdf; STEPHEN P. DuNN, THE EcoNOMicS OF JOHN
KENNETH GALBRAITH, chs. 5, 7 & 8 (2011); JOHN BELLAMY FOSTER & ROBERT W.
McCHESNEY, THE ENDLESS CRISIs: How MONOPOLY-FINANCE CAPTTAL PRODUCES
STAGNATION AND UPHEAVAL FROM THE U.S.A TO CHINA (2012); Corporate
Concentration, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 2016).
221 See, e.g., Aditi Bagchi, The Myth of Equality in the Employment Relation, 2009
MICH. ST. L. REV. 579, 586 (2009) (noting that today "most consumers are not in a position
to bargain over the terms on which they purchase ordinary consumer goods"); Steven
Flower, Note, Toward Correcting the Misapplication of Subrogation Doctrine in California
Healthcare, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1039, 1060 (2004) ("In modern society, the bargaining
power of consumers is weak due to their necessary dependence on products and services
provided by others with greater knowledge of those products and services."); Batya
Goodman, Note, Honey, I Shrink-Wrapped the Consumer: The Shrink-Wrap Agreement as
an Adhesion Contract, 21 CARDozo L. REv. 319, 323-24 (1999) ("Today, the typical
agreement consists of a standard printed form prepared by one party in the superior
bargaining position and adhered to by the other party, who has little or no opportunity for
bargaining.").
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the protections of unions.222 The second is that the content of the reg-
ulation the state must enforce is often designed to shift power back to
them or to constrain abuses of power by firms-whether through
wage and hour regulation, workplace safety law, antidiscrimination
law, antitrust law, consumer protection law, and the like.
Congress's choice to rely so often on private enforcement to reg-
ulate firms' power and shift or remedy power imbalances, if anything,
provides more reasons today to insist on public adjudication for par-
ties like individual workers and consumers taking on corporate behe-
moths. That is, in light of the relatively unequal power between
citizen-regulators and firms, one would expect that the state, in asking
those citizens to regulate, would provide easily accessible public path-
ways for them to achieve the social welfare goals embodied in legisla-
tion. Procedural deconstruction is being used to remove the
protections of public process for the very parties whose rights, statu-
tory and otherwise, depend on litigating and therefore to weaken the
American regulatory system generally.223
All of this is not to deny that questions about litigation's effi-
ciency, manageability, or excesses are appropriate values to con-
sider.224 Instead, it is to assert that the empirical evidence suggests
222 See, e.g., Wilma B. Liebman, "Regilding the Gilded Age": The Labor Question
Reemerges, 45 STETSON L. REV. 19, 23-24 (2015) (attributing the growing imbalance
between worker and corporate power to factors including: growth in foreign trade and
deregulation, technology advancement, globalized markets, Wall Street's influence
"expand[ing] dramatically," and a shift to financial capitalism that treats companies as
"assets to be bought and sold"). See generally KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS
To DIGrrs: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE (2004) (arguing
that employment laws today fit an outdated notion of stable employer-employee
relationships, thus providing less security for workers); DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED
WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO
IMPROVE IT (2014) (analyzing how fundamental restructuring of employment decreases
protections for workers).
223 Burbank & Farhang, supra note 212, at 1613-14.
224 For example, one can see the issues and areas for reform in the class action context
while still thinking it serves useful purposes. See generally JOHN C. COFFEE, JR.,
ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE (2015) (providing a "warts
and all" view of, and ultimate defense of, class action); David Betson & Jay Tidmarsh,
Optimal Class Size, Opt-Out Rights, and "Indivisible" Remedies, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
542, 569-70 (2011) (considering circumstances under which benefits accrue unevenly to
counsel and class representatives); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability:
Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370,
418-25 (2000) (considering potential conflicts between class counsel and members); Owen
M. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 21 (1996)
(considering issues related to class counsel's self-appointment and notice to plaintiffs);
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs Attorney's Role in Class Action
and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1 (1991) (exploring how plaintiffs' counsel play an entrepreneurial role that
raises the prospect of pursuing their own interests over those of their clients).
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that these concerns have been overstated, while concerns about
ensuring that litigation can fulfill its regulatory and social welfare
functions have been undervalued. Indeed, the time period where arbi-
tration was more constrained, the class action was stronger, and public
adjudication was less encumbered and more easily allowed workers
and consumers to vindicate statutory rights may have served a more
modest end-working towards shifting unequal economic power to
workers and consumers. This is an end that the progressive logic
underlying the parity principle would welcome, if not demand.
The second argument-that arbitration is superior-might offer
some saving grace if it could be established. But here, too, the findings
are troubling for parties lacking relative parity. Analyzing nearly five
thousand cases filed by consumers before the American Arbitration
Association, David Horton and Andrea Chandrasekher came to three
conclusions. 225 First, the weakening of consumer class actions has led
plaintiffs' lawyers to bring more individual cases before arbitral fora
than before. 226 Second, consumers and workers lose more often than
they win in those fora, even though predictively this should not be the
case. 2 2 7 And, third, "high-level" and "super" repeat players such as
"elite corporations" win even more. 228 The researchers conclude that
the Supreme Court's caselaw has both "shield[ed] big companies from
class action liability" and, by shifting public claims-including class
ones-to individual claims within arbitration, has "allow[ed] them to
dominate [those] individual cases." 229
Other empirical studies also cast doubt on the claim about arbi-
tration's virtues. One scholar studying how employees fare in arbitra-
tion concludes that they are subjected to poorer process, see their
bargaining power in dispute resolution reduced, receive lower
payouts, and that the arbitral process generally "disrupts existing
mechanisms for enforcement of individual employment rights." 230 As
I alluded to in Part I, some studies suggest that while parties litigate,
they largely do not arbitrate, thereby foregoing valid claims.231 Recent
studies also cast doubt on the efficiency of arbitration, noting high
225 David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An Empirical
Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 63 (2015).
226 Id. at 63, 99-101.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 63, 102-14.
229 Id.
230 Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in
Employment, 35 BERKELEY J. Emp. & LAB. L. 71, 89-90 (2014).
231 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
298 [Vol. 93:249
THE PARITY PRINCIPLE
costs and its limited ability to enable parties to vindicate even clearly
established statutory rights. 2 3 2
3. Relationship to Labor Arbitration
Finally, one might argue that labor arbitration in the union-firm
context undermines this Article's thesis because, to the extent that the
parity principle and labor arbitration are intended to be worker-
protective, they each offer conflicting views about the benefits or
drawbacks of privatized process and disparate ways of achieving social
welfare goals.
To sort these points out, it is helpful to briefly consider the
unique structure and history of labor arbitration in the United States.
Labor arbitration arose in part because unions could not rely on
courts to enforce collective bargaining agreements in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, and they turned instead to griev-
ance arbitration. 2 3 3 Arbitration through collective bargaining
agreements spread in the following decades, and while the model was
entrenched at the time of the enactment of the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935, which protected the right of workers to bargain
collectively, the statute did not speak to labor arbitration but gener-
ally left the regime intact.234 In 1947, Congress passed the Labor
Management Relations Act. 2 3 5 Section 301 provided federal district
courts with jurisdiction to hear labor disputes, 236 and a series of deci-
sions written by Justice Douglas interpreting it created a preference
for labor arbitration and a strong presumption of non-interference
with labor arbitration agreements and awards. 3 7
232 See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration, 67
LAW & CONTEM'. PROBS. 133, 133-34, 161 (2004) (concluding that "the cost of arbitration
is often prohibitively high"); Mark D. Gough, The High Costs ofan Inexpensive Forum: An
Empirical Analysis of Employment Discrimination Claims Heard in Arbitration and Civil
Litigation, 35 BERKELEY J. Em'. & LAB. L. 91, 95-96, 112 (2014) (surveying employment
discrimination claims and finding that "outcomes in arbitration are starkly inferior to
outcomes reported in litigation"); Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 225, at 82, 101-02
(finding that arbitration costs were higher than reported or predicted).
233 See Stone, supra note 45, at 1008-09 (studying the historic use of arbitration in labor
relations as a self-regulating measure).
234 Pub. L. No. 64-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 151-169 (2012)).
235 Taft-Hartley Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947).
236 Id. § 301.
237 See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960)
(holding that courts should honor agreements to arbitrate without weighing the merits of
the suit or grievance); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 596 (1960) (holding that, in considering arbitration awards and remedies, courts
should not go into the merits); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 585 (1960) (holding that courts should presume the validity of an
arbitration provision and only intervene when there is no agreement to arbitrate); Textile
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There are two main justifications for labor arbitration. The first is
that it prevents strikes and therefore economic disruption and indus-
trial unrest.238 The second is that it is part and parcel of industrial self-
government. 239 It is part of a model of "self-regulation" between
organized workers and firms, overseen by an administrative body, the
National Labor Relations Board.240 At its roots, labor arbitration
reflected a distrust of courts and a voluntarist view that "the processes
of the state-the courts and administrative tribunals-should keep
out" of the workplace, "an island of self-rule." 241 Labor arbitration in
this way reflects a view that industrial relations between organized
workers and firms are distinctive. As Justice Douglas put it in United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., "[t]he col-
lective agreement covers the whole employment relationship. It calls
into being a new common law-the common law of a particular
industry or of a particular plant." 242 Labor arbitration is a process by
which that common law is made.2 4 3
Labor arbitration, then, does not involve the relatively unequal
bargaining power that exists in the individual employee-employer dis-
pute. The notion, indeed, is that labor arbitration helps to constitute a
"shared normative community in which both parties participate,"
much unlike individual worker-employer arbitration in which the
employee does not "play a participatory role in framing the rules,
Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957) (concluding that
Section 301 "expresses a federal policy that federal courts should enforce [arbitration]
agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations and that industrial peace can be
best obtained only in that way").
238 See Roberto L. Corrada, The Arbitral Imperative in Labor and Employment Law, 47
CATH. U. L. REV. 919, 923 (1998) ("The major impetus for arbitration in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and during World War II, was as an alternative to
disruptive, and sometimes violent, strikes."); Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams,
American Labor Arbitration: The Early Years, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 373, 382 (1983)
("Arbitration gained early acceptance in those American industries that were especially
vulnerable to economic losses occasioned by strikes.").
239 See, e.g., Corrada, supra note 238, at 924 (arguing labor arbitration "encourages
collective bargaining, consistent with a private industrial pluralist vision of labor-
management relations"); see also United Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 567 ("Arbitration is a
stabilizing influence only as it serves as a vehicle for handling any and all disputes that arise
under the agreement."); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American
Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981) (describing the development of the ideal of
industrial self-government).
240 Stone, supra note 45, at 1008 (describing self-regulation as a "central theme" in the
interpretation and implementation of the National Labor Relations Act).
241 Stone, supra note 239, at 1515.
242 363 U.S. 574, 579 (1960).
243 Id. at 578-79.
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norms, and customs of the community." 2 " In this sense, one could
argue that the existence of labor union arbitration and the prohibition
of individual employee arbitration in section 1 make sense together.
And neither predominates as a statement of the desirability of arbitra-
tion or avoiding it for workers, because even at their height, unions
did not cover half of American workers, and therefore significant
shares of the workforce faced differing contexts when resolving dis-
putes with employers.245 The different approaches of labor arbitration
and the parity principle may reflect contextualized, rather than com-
peting, views about courts. One need not believe that courts excel at
protecting workers' rights to believe that, in the absence of unions and
where individual workers are involved, they are superior to a priva-
tized process that companies may dominate.
Thus, the reason the state may not want individual workers to
resolve disputes with companies, but may accept organized workers
doing so, is that in the former case, the economic power disparity
helps to form the state's interest in protecting workers and shifting
power back to workers. But unions are a mechanism of countervailing
power themselves. They are more equipped to resolve disputes on rel-
atively equal footing and are capable of shifting power back to
workers; therefore, the lack of state oversight is justifiable in labor
arbitration.246 That is, both unions and the state can serve as vehicles
of countervailing power for workers; in this case, one substitutes for
another. And while publicity is lost, other advantages may be gained.
Indeed, some assert, including the Supreme Court, that labor arbitra-
tion is superior to courts in adjudicating disputes that arise in the
industrial process.247 A labor arbitrator is "usually chosen because of
the parties' confidence in his knowledge of the common law of the
shop and their trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear consid-
erations which are not expressed in the contract as criteria for
judgment." 248
244 Stone, supra note 45, at 1029-30 (contrasting arbitration in trade association cases
with arbitration in franchise and employment cases).
245 Steven Greenhouse, Union Membership in US. Fell to a 70-Year Low Last Year,
N.Y. TiMEs (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/22/business/ 22 union.html
("The peak unionization rate was 35 percent during the mid-1950s, after a surge in
unionization during the Great Depression and after World War II.").
246 See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF
COUNTERVAILING POWER 137-55 (1952) (exploring how both labor unions and New Deal
legislation facilitated the ability of workers and consumers to aggregate power and to
counterbalance the power of concentrated industries).
247 Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 581 ("The labor arbitrator performs functions which are
not normal to the courts; the considerations which help him fashion judgments may indeed
be foreign to the competence of courts.").
248 Id. at 582.
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While I think this argument explains why labor arbitration and
section l's individual worker exclusion can coherently coexist and
have historically coexisted on separate planes, the argument is not
without weaknesses. In particular, there are strong arguments that
privatizing disputes between unions and firms does not always serve
workers well. For example, some query whether the voluntarist ideal
of privatizing relations between unions and firms stifles a broader
public collective consciousness that might strengthen the labor move-
ment.249 Furthermore, scholars argue that labor arbitration does not
function as described and indeed may systemically undercut worker
power 2 5 0 and be employer-biased. 25 1 (One might argue that class arbi-
tration, where parties aggregate into class form within arbitral fora,
might face similar structural burdens. 252)
249 See, e.g., William Forbath, Law and the Shaping of Labor Politics in the United States
and England, in LABOR LAW IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL AND CRITIcAL ESSAYS
(Christopher L. Tomlins & Andrew J. King eds., 1992) (comparing American and English
labor's experiences with their respective countries' legal orders); Katherine V.W. Stone,
The Steelworkers' Trilogy: The Evolution of Labor Arbitration, in LABOR LAw STORIES
186-87 (Laura J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fiske eds., 2005) (arguing arbitration's private
nature contributes to the labor movement's isolation rather than bringing labor's concerns
"into the public arena and foster[ing] alliances with other social groups.").
250 Stone, supra note 239, at 1516-17, 1565 (finding labor arbitration to be "a vehicle for
the manipulation of employee discontent and for the legitimation of existing inequalities of
power in the workplace" insofar as it removes employees' greatest tool of power-
disorder-and makes arbitrators, "by intervening to preserve order . . . not only
non[-]neutral" but also "act[] consistently on the side of management").
251 See, e.g., Corrada, supra note 238, at 926 (summarizing these arguments); see
generally JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUEs AND AssuMrIONs IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW
160-70 (1983) (discussing the duties of successor employers to arbitrate pursuant to a
predecessor's collective agreement); Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner
Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265
(1978) (arguing that the attempt to ease the oppression of working people through the
National Labor Relations Act ultimately reinforced institutional bases of oppression).
252 Class arbitration could also be thought to resolve some of the power asymmetries I
have addressed, but I do not consider it here because I have concerns that it is a
procedurally problematic variant on class actions. As one commentator puts it, class
actions within the sphere of public adjudication are justified because they, unlike class
arbitration, "require court involvement to, among other things, ensure fairness, obtain
public input, ensure strict adherence to rules, and provide other procedural safeguards."
Neal Troum, The Problem with Class Arbitration, 38 VT. L. REv. 419, 443 (2013). Class
arbitrations also pose due process issues because they allow absent members' claims to be
extinguished based on a contract under which "[a]bsent class members cannot by definition
have empowered an arbitrator to adjudicate their claims." Id. at 442; see also Andrew
Powell & Richard A. Bales, Ethical Problems in Class Arbitration, 2011 J. Disp. RESOL.
309, 310 (considering various procedural problems with class arbitration, including the lack
of "standard[s] to keep arbitrators neutral and their counsel selection decisions unbiased
from financial and social influence"). The Supreme Court has also cast doubt on whether
class arbitration is compatible with the FAA, though, because it reduces the speed and
efficiency of arbitration. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2011)
("[T]he switch from bilateral to class arbitration sacrifices the principal advantage of
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These critiques of labor arbitration do not strike at the vitality of
the parity principle. On a rosy view of the story, the parity principle
and labor arbitration both align with Furuseth's view: 2 5 3 When parity
is lacking, courts play an important role in overseeing disputes and
when it is not, unions hold power in the scheme of industrial self-
government, and arbitration is permissible and maybe preferable. On
a less rosy view, the parity principle and its commitments to the role
of courts in fleshing out rights and protecting workers may have
broader application. But however one judges them, historically the
FAA and labor arbitration were twin vessels steered on the path to
augmenting worker power and protecting workers. As the economic
world has fractured, unraveling workers from unions and positioning
them and consumers against increasingly concentrated firms, 2 5 4 the
parity principle may have more to offer in guiding where law ends and
arbitration begins.255
III
IMPLICATIONS
In this Part, I explore the implications of recognizing the parity
principle. In Section A, I argue that it provides a theory demon-
strating the incorrectness of the Supreme Court's reading of section 1
as it applies to employees. In Section B, I argue that the principle
provides a better conceptual framework for animating legislative and
administrative reforms excluding workers and consumers from federal
arbitration law. In Section C, I argue that the principle supplies argu-
arbitration-its informality-and makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely
to generate procedural morass than final judgment."); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685-86 (2010) ("In bilateral arbitration, parties forgo the
procedural rigor and appellate review of the courts in order to realize the benefits of
private dispute resolution . But the relative benefits of class-action arbitration are
much less assured.").
253 See supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
254 See, e.g., Heather M. Whitney, Rethinking the Ban on Employer-Labor Organization
Cooperation, 37 CARDozo L. REV. 1455, 1457 (2016) ("In 1959, 32.3% of the private
sector labor force was unionized. In 2005, only 7.8% of workers in the private sector were.
By 2011, that number was down to 6.9%, and in 2014 that number dropped again, to
6.6%."); Rebecca E. Zietlow, A Positive Right to Free Labor, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 859,
892-93 (2016) ("Union density in the United States has declined to an all-time low."). See
generally SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEw DEAL TO THE
NEw RIGHT (2014) (exploring why most Americans lack constitutional rights-including
freedoms of speech, association, and privacy-in the workplace).
255 However, labor unions can and should play roles in this endeavor. For example, Ann
Hodges argues that unions should provide both representation for individual workers in
arbitration, where plaintiffs' lawyers may not have the incentives to do so, and should lead
the campaign against individual employee-employer arbitration. Ann C. Hodges, Trilogy
Redux: Using Arbitration to Rebuild the Labor Movement, 98 MINN. L. REv. 1682 (2014).
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ments for at least limiting the extension of the FAA in cases involving
statutory rights, if not outright denying it in many instances, and for
rethinking the Court's FAA preemption cases.
A. Worker Arbitration
The interpretation of the legislative history that I have offered
here at its most basic level reveals the logic of why the statute
excludes all individual employees within Congress's regulatory
authority from its coverage. Scholars have made claims about section
1's exclusion, and this Article's contribution has been to reason out-
ward towards a theory that captures the purpose, logic, and context of
section 1. I thus explore here how this Article's recasting of the legis-
lative history strengthens and provides a richer theoretical framework
for interpreting section 1 vis-A-vis employees.
Individual employee agreements mandating arbitration
"exploded onto the scene in 1991" and have grown ever since.256 In
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Supreme Court held that
a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967257
could be subjected to compulsory arbitration so long as the worker
could not establish that an arbitration proceeding was inadequate to
vindicate rights under the statute. 258 Because the plaintiff brought his
claim pursuant to an agreement in a securities registration applica-
tion-not an employment contract-the Gilmer Court did not address
whether section 1 excludes individual employees from the FAA's cov-
erage. It took up the invitation in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams in
2001.259 A narrow majority declined to look at legislative history or
context, and instead held that section 1 only excluded "transportation
workers,,but not other employment contracts." 260
Recall that section 1 excludes from the Act's coverage "contracts
of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."26 1 The majority
reached its conclusion about the narrowness of the section applying
the ejusdem generis canon, which as it said, is "the statutory canon
that where general words follow specific words in a statutory enumer-
ation, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar
256 Richard A. Bales, Normative Consideration of Employment Arbitration at Gilmer's
Quinceafiera, 81 TUL. L. REv. 331, 332 (2006) (arguing mandatory arbitration needs a
clear set of due process rules, as well as penalties for employers who deter valid claims).
257 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2012).
258 500 U.S. 20, 30-32 (1991).
259 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001).
260 Id.
261 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
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in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific
words." 262 The majority thus limited section 1's general reference to
employees "engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" to employees
like the seamen and railroad workers with which the clause begins. 2 6 3
The majority also reasoned that because section 2 of the statute pro-
vides for arbitration of contracts "involving commerce," and section 1
exempts workers "engaged in" interstate commerce, section 1 is likely
intended to be narrower.264
The dissents showed the flaws in the Court's reasoning. Justice
Stevens, joined by three other justices, asserted that the history of the
FAA "makes clear that the FAA was a response to the refusal of
courts to enforce commercial arbitration agreements." 2 6 5 Justice
Stevens also addressed some of the legislative discussions presented in
Part II, demonstrating that employees were generally intended to be
excluded, and concluded that the history "amply supports the proposi-
tion that [section 1] was an uncontroversial provision that merely con-
firmed the fact that no one interested in the enactment of the FAA
ever intended or expected that § 2 would apply to employment con-
tracts." 266 The majority, however, was "[p]laying ostrich" with this his-
tory, pretending that the text was so clear that, reading it and
employing the maxim ejusdem generis, it needed not turn to it.267
Margaret Moses views the Court's interpretive position on
ejusdem generis as an ironic one, because:
the Court has repeatedly asserted that canons of construction are to
be used when a statute is not clear and that legislative history can
overcome the use of canons of construction. Here, the Court turned
the methodology upside down, saying that ejusdem generis made
the statute so clear that legislative history did not need to be
assessed.268
At any rate, as David Schwartz notes, it is difficult to argue that
the text is not ambiguous in a way that would trigger the canon: "The
distortion worked on the FAA by the subsequent expansion of the
Commerce Clause, the unusual 'involving commerce' and 'evidencing
262 Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 114-15 (internal quotations omitted).
263 Id. at 115 (rejecting a broader interpretation of the clause, because "[u]nder this rule
of construction the residual clause should be read to give effect to the terms 'seamen' and
'railroad employees,' and should itself be controlled and defined by reference to the
enumerated categories of workers.which are recited just before it").
264 Id. at 115-18 ("The plain meaning of the words 'engaged in commerce' is narrower
than the more open-ended formulations 'affecting commerce' and 'involving
commerce."').
265 Id. at 125 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
266 Id. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
267 Id.
268 Moses, supra note 18, at 147-48.
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a transaction' language in section 2's coverage provision, and the
sharp disagreement among courts and commentators over the exclu-
sion's meaning all support th[e] conclusion" that section 1 is at least
ambiguous. 269
In a powerful dissent also joined by three other justices, Justice
Souter reasoned that Congress named seamen and railroad workers
because they were the parties that the federal government could at the
time regulate under the common understanding of the reach of the
Commerce Clause, and then followed the description of those parties
with others "engaged in . . . interstate commerce" so the exclusion
could grow elastically with workers considered to fall within
Congress's Commerce Clause authority.270 Justice Souter also posited
that the Court's conclusion that section 1's verbiage "engaged in com-
merce" was narrower than "affecting commerce" was nonsensical. The
phrase "engaged in" was merely linked to the way Congress under-
stood its Commerce Clause power vis-A-vis workers at the time.
Justice Souter's dissent, to my mind, shows why even some com-
mitted textualists would have reason to be concerned with the
majority's decision in Circuit City: Because the text is unclear, the leg-
islative history and context surrounding the scope of the Commerce
Clause at the time help to illuminate the meaning of the text. In this
way, the history and context are useful to a textualist insofar as they
clarify which workers Congress had in mind and the historical context
that shaped its regulatory undertaking. Yet, the majority ignores this
history. And it does so in ways that conflict with its approach in other
arbitration cases. As Justice Souter noted, the Court had before read
the phrase "affecting commerce" in section 2 to be elastic, to expand
as the definition of interstate commerce expands.271 The most logical
conclusion was that the drafters added "workers engaged in ... inter-
state commerce" after specifying ones who were then thought to be
engaged because they wanted section 1 to be elastic: to encompass all
workers within the federal government's regulatory domain.272
The history and interpretation I have offered help to support the
dissenters' reading of the meaning of "engaged in . . . interstate com-
merce" by showcasing the underlying logic of why section 1 would be
designed to exclude all employees within Congress's ambit. First,
269 David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The
Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 14-15 (2004)
(arguing the oft-cited "national policy favoring arbitration" is problematic from a
federalism perspective).
270 Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 134-39 (Souter, J., dissenting).
271 Id. at 134.
272 Id. at 135-37.
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drawing together the statements about employees cited by Justice
Stevens with other statements about economic power helps to reveal
the purposes of the statute, which were not merely to avoid having
seamen and railroad employees fall within its coverage, but instead to
withdraw workers from its coverage when such deep economic power
disparities mandated that the state oversee dispute resolution. Justices
Stevens and Souter do not go into the statements by Senator Walsh
about "take it or leave it contracts" involving employees generally, or
the assurances from Piatt that the FAA was not intended to extend to
such circumstances where power disparities were so wide. Nor do they
go into the acknowledgement by Cohen that courts were concerned
about arbitration clauses involving unequal bargaining power coupled
with his assurance that Congress was intervening or would intervene
to protect such parties. All of these statements evince a deeper intent
to protect employees generally and a theory of the role of public adju-
dication in doing so. Section 1 reflects a progressive view about the
nature of economic power and the need for state intervention that
breathes life and purpose into the employee exception and supports
the more expansive view of it.
Embedding the principle in a particular view of regulation reveals
why Circuit City matters so much. 2 7 3 The parity principle conflicts
with the view of the FAA's regulatory commitments that the Court
advances generally in its FAA jurisprudence. For that reason, it
threatens much of the Court's reasoning. After all, if Congress was
excluding workers from the statute's coverage based on power dispari-
ties and regulatory concerns, then why would Congress be construed
as intending to preempt the very state laws and doctrines designed to
protect economically less powerful parties like workers? Or how could
it be construed as meaning to subject federal statutory claims so often
designed also to protect workers and consumers to arbitration? Get-
ting at the principle underlying section 1 shows why Circuit City
touches a nerve: Understanding section 1 differently potentially
entails understanding the FAA differently.
B. Consumer Arbitration
The parity principle's logic sweeps more broadly. It can do more
novel normative work than it does in the employee context by pro-
273 One implication of the Circuit City decision permitting worker arbitration is that the
Supreme Court is now considering whether employer-mandated arbitration agreements
waiving class and collective actions interfere with the collective action provisions of the
National Labor Relations Act. See Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir.
2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017) (No. 16-285).
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viding a more satisfying theory for why legislators and administrative
agencies should shield individual consumers from arbitration.
To conclude that the FAA should not be applied to consumers,
scholars typically argue that the FAA was meant to be applied only to
merchants or that it was meant to be applied only when parties "con-
sented knowingly and voluntarily." 2 7 4 However, the Supreme Court,
in its neo-contractarian interpretation, has extended the FAA to a
variety of consumers, often bound by contracts of adhesion.275 The
arguments against so extending the FAA are unpersuasive in part
because they fall prey to the issues around the meaning and scope of
consent that plague the contract paradigm. These arguments also fail
to articulate a deeper underlying theory of why consumers should not
fall within the statute's range. The parity principle can do work in this
regard, showing more clearly why consumer arbitration is inconsistent
with a central purpose of the FAA and the regulatory commitments it
expresses.
Because section l's exclusion only references workers, the parity
principle is unlikely to aid in judicial interpretation of section 1 or the
statute generally. But the logic of the parity principle provides a
firmer basis for legislative and administrative efforts to eliminate or
oversee consumer arbitration. The text and history of section 1 make
it clear that Congress excluded individual employees from the FAA's
coverage because (i) there was deeply unequal bargaining power
between workers as diffuse parties and employers; (ii) workers would
end up accepting "take it or leave it" contracts mandating arbitration;
and (iii) these contracts would exclude workers from the processes
and protections of courts and be contrary to legislators' efforts to pro-
tect them. These views reflect a progressive view of economic power
and the role of the state in correcting economic power disparities for
social welfare reasons. All of this reasoning can be extended to indi-
vidual consumers as well.
First, consumer protection law flows from the same premises
about unequal economic power and supports the same conclusions
regarding the need for state intervention to correct it. Consumer pro-
tection impulses stem from "reform notions rooted in the Progressive
movement of the early twentieth century," which sought to employ
274 Moses, supra note 18, at 112.
275 E.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (finding the
Federal Arbitration Act preempts judicial rules regarding the unconscionability of class
arbitration waivers); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995)
(holding that section 2's interstate commerce language should be read broadly to extend
the Federal Arbitration Act's reach to the limits of the Commerce Clause power); see also
supra Section I.C.
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"government power to remedy the unequal bargaining power of the
individual" through antitrust law, food safety protections, and other
regulations "enacted in part to offset control by increasingly large and
powerful corporations of the labor and consumer marketplace." 2 7 6 At
the turn of the twentieth century, Congress passed the consumer pro-
tection laws on food safety, which formed the foundations of the
modern FDA, 2 7 7 created the Federal Trade Commission in 1914 to
protect consumers from unfair competition and practices,278 and con-
tinued passing consumer protection laws regulating various areas of
the economy through the 1920s and 1930s in the lead up to the New
Deal.279 And in contrast to labor law, the Court largely did not inter-
fere with Progressive-Era consumer protection law. 28 0
Indeed, the various consumer protection laws later passed in the
1960s and 1970s were also "enacted in part to remedy the unequal
bargaining power of individual consumers in a marketplace domi-
nated by large corporations" and in this way followed the Progressive-
Era view of economic power.281 From the Progressive Era to the pre-
sent, "perceived inequality of bargaining power between merchants
and consumers" has been a cornerstone of consumer protection
law.2 8 2 But even with the rise of consumer protection law, consumers
never developed a vehicle like labor unions to provide them with an
adequate collective voice before legal disputes arise. Consumers are
still relatively diffuse vis-A-vis the firms with which they interact,
276 Prentiss Cox, Goliath Has the Slingshot: Public Benefit and Private Enforcement of
Minnesota Consumer Protection Laws, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 163, 172 (2006) (arguing
that restricting individual private rights of action under statutory fraud laws impairs the
enforcement of consumer protection laws); see also MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A
NEw ECONOMY: PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1900-1933 (1990)
(describing the relationship between rapid economic change and regulatory policy in the
early twentieth century); JoHN F. WALKER & HAROLD G. VATTER, THE RISE OF BIG
GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 19-20 (1997) (tracing the evolution of public
demands for intervention and government responses to those demands).
277 See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L.
REv. 1189, 1225-27 (1986) (discussing the passage of the Pure Food and Drugs Act and the
Meat Inspection Act in 1906).
278 Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, §§ 1, 5, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41, 45 (2012)).
279 See, e.g., Robert I. Field, The Malpractice Crisis Turns 175: What Lessons Does
History Hold for Reform?, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 7, 26 (2011) (situating patient protections in
medical malpractice law as part of a larger movement resulting in the enactment of several
consumer protection measures).
280 Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of Substantive Due
Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REv. 751, 754 & n.19 (2009).
281 Cox, supra note 276, at 173.
282 DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW
§ 2.9 (2017).
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which may explain as much as anything the prevalence of contracts of
adhesion.
The statements in the legislative history about parity also support
the conclusion that the parity principle should encompass consumers.
Piatt's response to Senator Walsh's concern about the FAA being
used to enforce "take it or leave it" contracts applies as equally to
consumers, who also lack meaningful bargaining power, as to workers;
recall that he "would not favor any kind of legislation that would
permit the forcing a man to sign that [kind of] a contract" and reiter-
ated that the statute's intended end is arbitration between
merchants. 28 3 Similarly, Cohen's response that courts designed ouster
doctrine out of concern that stronger parties would take advantage of
less advantaged ones through arbitration, and that both courts and
Congress would protect them, also applies to consumer law. 2 8 4 From
the beginning of the twentieth century through the present, Congress
and state legislatures have passed consumer protection laws, and fed-
eral and state courts have enforced them, relying on this view of eco-
nomic power disparities and of the state's role in correcting them.
Finally, Furuseth's analysis about how courts offer advantages to less
powerful parties and about the importance of having courts flesh out
the contours of laws designed to protect those parties also applies to
consumers.
Taking these points together, one can see how (i) there often is
vastly unequal bargaining power between consumers and companies;
(ii) individual consumers often end up accepting "take it or leave it"
contracts mandating arbitration; and (iii) Congress has passed laws,
which courts interpret, in order to protect consumers in light of the
economic power imbalances and their social welfare effects. Con-
sumers, then, look like the workers at the center of section 1's parity
principle: They are diffuse, disadvantaged in negotiating and resolving
disputes with firms, and, in light of the advantages that the law has
granted firms and the state's interest in consumers' social welfare, the
state has reason to oversee their disputes with firms and to interpret
the laws designed to protect them. That is, for the same reasons laid
out in Part II, the state has reason to insist on public adjudication.
Though these arguments about consumers do not offer relief for
courts interpreting section 1, the parity principle provides stronger
affirmative reasons to limit consumer arbitration now in the legislative
and administrative context. And, to the extent that the Supreme
Court's decision in Circuit City, though wrongly decided, remains in
283 See 1923 Hearings, supra note 117, at 9-10.
284 See Joint Hearings, supra note 37, at 14-15.
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place, it also provides stronger reasons for legislative and administra-
tive interventions for employees. The parity principle unwinds section
1's terse text, clarifying the rich thought that shapes the state's interest
in overseeing disputes so characterized by power disparities. The prin-
ciple illuminates the reasons that worker and consumer disputes ought
to be removed from the FAA's enforcement provisions, as the Arbi-
tration Fairness Act, introduced in Congress several times over the
past few years, would do.2 8 5 The parity principle could be employed
by legislators trying to pass the Arbitration Fairness Act as a state-
ment of FAA reformers' intent to exclude diffuse parties contracting
with firms from arbitration for social welfare reasons. And, more gen-
erally, the principle's progressive logic of worker and consumer pro-
tection could similarly be employed by legislators.
The parity principle could also be employed by administrative
agencies that in recent years have assumed a more active posture over
arbitration involving consumers and workers.28 6 For example, pur-
suant to its authority under the Dodd-Frank Act,2 8 7 the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau has studied the use of consumer arbitra-
tion agreements and has the authority to impose conditions on or limit
such agreements if doing so is in "the public interest" and will protect
consumers.288 It recently released a final rule prohibiting banks, credit
card companies, and other financial firms from impeding consumers'
rights to file or join group lawsuits, which Congress prohibited from
going into effect.289 This is likely not the end of that battle. The parity
285 See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, S. 537, 115th Cong. (2017); Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007); see also Megan Leonhardt, Democrats
Fight to Curb Mandatory Arbitration, TIME: MONEY (Mar. 7, 2017), http://time.com/
money/4694256/democrats-employers-court-mandatory-arbitration/ (describing the 2017
Senate bill and noting that "[t]his is not the first time lawmakers have attempted to curb
companies' use of arbitration. [Senator Al] Franken, as well as others, have introduced bills
in previous Congresses that have not gone anywhere.").
286 See, e.g., Daniel I. Deacon, Essay, Agencies and Arbitration, 117 COLUM. L. REv.
991, 1014-22 (2017) (exploring how agencies have banned arbitration in some
circumstances, gathered information to assess whether to ban it in others, and imposed
limits on arbitration in yet others).
287 See 12 U.S.C. § 5518(a)-(b) (2012).
288 Id.; see CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY PRELMINARY
RESULTS: SECTION 1028(A) STUDY RESULTS To DATE (2013), http://files.consumerfinance
.gov/f/201312_cfpb arbitration-study-preliminary-results.pdf; CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK
WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION Acr § 1028(A) (2015); see also
Deacon, supra note 286, at 1014-19; CFPB Launches Public Inquiry into Arbitration
Clauses, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.consumerfinance
.gov/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-launches-public-inquiry-into-
arbitration-clauses/.
289 See Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 55,500 (Nov. 22, 2017) (revoking the
earlier rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 33,210 (July 19, 2017), under the joint resolution of Congress and
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principle offers a theory of why regulations protecting consumers
going forward are justified.
C. Statutory Rights and Preemption
The parity principle can also bolster arguments for shielding
more statutory rights from arbitration. The FAA is silent on its appli-
cation to statutory rights and most of the statutes implicated in FAA
cases arose during or after the New Deal transformation, that is, after
the enactment of the FAA. But the parity principle offers a regulatory
theory that helps to justify the vindication-of-rights doctrine as a stat-
utory common law doctrine. While many arguments for having courts
more closely supervise the arbitration of statutory rights focus on the
vitality of statutory regulation generally, section 1 and its history sug-
gest a regulatory theory focused on both the importance of public
adjudication in safeguarding the rights of less powerful economic par-
ties and on the regulatory reasons for the state to protect these parties
through legislation subjected to judicial interpretation.
Recall the shifting history of the vindication-of-rights doctrine,
which has been weakened over time. In Wilko v. Swan,290 the Court
refused to enforce an arbitration clause in a dispute over whether a
brokerage firm violated the Securities Act of 1933, concluding that the
clause interfered with the Securities Act's purposes. 291 The Securities
Act "was drafted with an eye to the disadvantages under which buyers
[of securities] labor," and the arbitration clause would only exacerbate
those disadvantages because arbitrators' awards "may be made
without explanation of their reasons and without a complete record of
their proceedings" and deprive the plaintiff of understanding or chal-
lenging "arbitrators' conception of the legal meaning of [the] statutory
requirements." 2 9 2 Because the Court found that both public process
and appellate rights mattered under the statute, it demanded public
adjudication.
This would begin to change in the 1980s. In Mitsubishi, the Court
stated that the FAA "as a whole, is at bottom a policy guaranteeing
the enforcement of private contractual arrangements" and concluded
that there was "no reason" to depart from contractual agreement
by operation of the Congressional Review Act); see also CFPB Issues Rule to Ban
Companies from Using Arbitration Clauses to Deny Groups of People Their Day in Court,
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (July 10, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-
us/newsroom/cfpb-issues-rule-ban-companies-using-arbitration-clauses-deny-groups-
people-their-day-court.
290 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
291 Id. at 435-38.
292 Id. at 435-36.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
312 [Vol. 93:249
THE PARITY PRINCIPLE
"where a party bound by an arbitration agreement raises claims
founded on statutory rights." 293 The Court reasoned that "we are well
past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration
and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development
of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution." 2 9 4 The
Court concluded that unless Congress expresses an intention that stat-
utory rights not be vindicated via arbitration, they generally could be
arbitrated upon a showing of consent to arbitrate. 295 The Court did
not deny the possibility that "legal constraints external to the parties'
agreement [could] foreclose[ ] the arbitration of those claims," 296 and
noted that an agreement to arbitrate could be put aside where vindi-
cating statutory rights would "be so gravely difficult and inconve-
nient" that by arbitrating a party would "for all practical purposes be
deprived of [its] day in court." 2 9 7 In future years, the Court held that
factors such as arbitration costs and fees could qualify as such impedi-
ments. 298 However, recently, the Court has indicated that even this
construction of the doctrine is too liberal: In American Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Restaurant, the Court concluded that an arbitration
clause only triggers the doctrine when it forces a party to waive its
"right" to vindicate a statutory claim.2 9 9
Scholars' critiques of this doctrine are largely external to the
FAA's text and history. Scholars argue that allowing for statutory
claims to be arbitrated sacrifices the development of legal precedent,
the public interpretation of statutes, which puts parties on notice of
wrongdoing, and even if it works to serve parties' private ends, fails to
secure public justice.3 00 They also note evidence of how rarely parties
arbitrate as compared to how much they litigate, suggesting that arbi-
tration weakens regulatory enforcement.30 '
The parity principle provides reasons emanating from the FAA's
history to critique the weakening of the vindication-of-rights doctrine,
and also situates the argument for judicial interpretation of statutory
293 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625-26
(1985).
294 Id. at 626-27.
295 See id. at 627-28 ("By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo
the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an
arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. It trades the procedures and opportunity for review
of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.").
296 Id. at 628.
297 Id. at 632 (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972)).
298 See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000).
299 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310-12 (2013); see also Aragaki, supra note 28, at 2018-21
(overviewing the shifts in the Court's reasoning).
300 See sources cited supra note 8.
301 See sources cited supra note 96.
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rights in a progressive theory of regulation. The framers of the FAA
articulated a regulatory role for the federal government in shifting
power to diffuse parties disadvantaged by the rise of industrialism
through public adjudication and legislation subjected to judicial inter-
pretation. The FAA was thus designed to allow merchants to arbitrate
and to protect workers from being forced into privatized process, in
part out of a belief that Congress, in passing statutes, and courts, in
interpreting them, would better protect them, re-shifting power
through public processes. The reasons that scholars offer for shielding
statutory rights involving workers and consumers from arbitration can
thus be located in the legislative history of the statute.
Section 1's parity logic casts doubt on whether any statutory
rights designed to shift power to parties like workers and consumers
should be drawn into arbitration through section 2. Indeed, the very
statutes that the Supreme Court, out of deference to the contract par-
adigm, allows to be interpreted within arbitral fora are often con-
sumer and worker protection statutes: antitrust laws, 3 0 2
antidiscrimination and age discrimination laws for workers,303 con-
sumer protection laws,30 4 and wage and hour laws, to name a few.3 0 5
Enfeebling legislation by allowing powerful parties to insist, often
through contracts of adhesion, on arbitration is to take away the two
central actors that Cohen, the FAA's architect, expected would pro-
tect workers.
While the parity paradigm thus suggests the advantages of legisla-
tive and administrative efforts to shield statutory rights somewhat
broadly from arbitration, it more modestly suggests the advantages of
the Court's approach in earlier cases, where it had a healthy skepti-
cism that arbitration could interfere with the vindication of statutory
rights and supervised the enforcement of arbitration agreements.
Recall that in Wilko, the Court considered the lack of parity between
the parties,30 6 the advantages of public process that the less powerful
party gives up,307 and how the "protective provisions of the Securities
Act require the exercise of judicial direction to fairly assure their
effectiveness." 308 This approach considers, as the parity principle
302 See, e.g., Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.
303 See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
304 See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 83, 92 (2000).
305 See also Sabbeth & Vladeck, supra note 8, at 806 (laying out in greater detail the
worker and consumer protective purposes of several statutes that arbitration undermines).
306 See 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953).
307 See id. at 435-46.
308 Id. at 437. Similarly, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 416 U.S. 36 (1974), the
Court stated that arbitration was a "comparatively inappropriate forum for the final
resolution of rights created by Title VII." 416 U.S. at 56.
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would, the power dynamics between parties and the regulatory aims
of legislation. In contrast, the post-Mitsubishi arbitration-valorization
approach allows the presumed priority of contract to interfere with
the ability of economically less powerful parties to demand public
justice.
An implication of this line of reasoning would also be to call into
question the Court's conclusion that the FAA was intended to pre-
empt state consumer and worker protection laws. The Supreme Court
has allowed the FAA to preempt state laws that are obstacles to fulfil-
ling the statute's purposes-namely, contract enforcement pur-
poses. 309 Scholars have argued persuasively that the FAA was not
intended either to apply in state court or to preempt state law.3 10 The
parity principle can add to these arguments by showing worker-pro-
tective purposes in the statute that reveal why Congress, especially in
1925 when so much of worker and consumer protection existed in
state law, would not want to override those regimes. Indeed, today the
state doctrines and laws that the Court preempts are often worker and
consumer protection ones. For example, the California unconsciona-
bility doctrine that the Supreme Court found was preempted by the
FAA in Concepcion was one regulating consumer adhesion con-
tracts.31 ' The impulse not to extend section 2 to parties with deeply
unequal economic power extends its demand for public adjudication
logically both to federal and state statutes and doctrines that are
worker and consumer protective. The principle provides another
reason to call into question the Supreme Court's FAA preemption
jurisprudence.
309 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
310 See, e.g., Aragaki, supra note 28, at 1954-55 ("[The Burger Court] took the bold step
of construing FAA section 2 to be an exercise of Congress's substantive lawmaking
power . . . even though the great weight of opinion was-and remains-that the FAA is
from start to finish a procedural statute applicable only in federal court."); Moses, supra
note 18, at 112 ("Today, the statute which was enacted as a procedural statute effective
only in federal court has been interpreted to apply to states and to preempt state law that
conflicts with the Court's interpretation of the FAA."); cf. Brian Farkas, The Continuing
Voice of Dissent: Justice Thomas and the Federal Arbitration Act, 22 HARv. NEGOT. L.
REv. 33, 61-76 (2016) (summarizing Justice Thomas's dissents in FAA interpretation cases,
which argue that the FAA is a procedural statute).
311 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 340, 352 (2011). The doctrine
that the Court held was preempted in Concepcion was the so-called Discover Bank
unconscionability doctrine. See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal.
2005) (holding that waivers of court proceedings are unconscionable when they are found
in adhesion contracts "in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties
predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with
the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large
numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money").
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CONCLUSION
This Article has developed the history and logic of section 1 of
the FAA, arguing that a parity principle resides beneath it. Mining its
text and legislative history, I have argued that section 1 offers recogni-
tion by Congress of how economic power disparities could infect
privatized process and a regulatory commitment to ensuring public
process where such disparities existed in order to ensure the social
welfare of workers. The principle reflects a view of how power dispari-
ties came to infuse economic relationships and of the role of the state,
through legislation and public adjudication, in facilitating the power of
economically less powerful parties. The principle establishes the FAA
as a foundational statute prefiguring the New Deal legal order and
aspects of its regulatory theory.
More broadly, my aim has been to demonstrate some of the ben-
efits of placing civil procedure in its early economic context. For a
generation, scholars often turned to procedure's relationship to reor-
dering the state rather than the market: to its function in reforming
state institutions, whether through school or prison reform litigation,
and in providing due process rights from and protections against the
state. Our modem civil procedure, though, grew up with the problems
of industrialism and was designed in part to be responsive to them. In
the American system, it is a mechanism of economic regulation.
The FAA is an early example of civil procedure's role in Amer-
ican law's imperfect yet remarkable reckoning with the rise of indus-
trial capitalism and the problems of economic power it created. The
statute draws a line where private forms of economic governance
cannot encroach any further without state oversight and public pro-
cess. In doing so, the FAA establishes itself as a formative part of
constructing civil procedure in the American tradition as an escape
from the realm of private governance, where diffuse parties like
workers and consumers deal with firms in the shadow of the state, as
well as insurance against the hegemony of that realm.
The parity principle in this way shaped a tradition of civil proce-
dure that allows diffuse economic actors to bring public claims
alleging that the conditions of private governance violate public norms
and values. The principle is both litigation- and regulation-promoting.
In light of the vast economic inequalities that the legal order had
allowed to develop with the rise of industrialism, it reflects an insis-
tence that the disputes between parties whose power is so disparate
remain in courts. The principle is a foundational part of the architec-
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ture establishing why in adjudication, as in other areas of regulation,
certain relationships require the active participation and oversight of
the state.
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